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The Theory of Judicial
Reasoning-Toward A Reconstruction
By PETER W. GROSS*
[E]xperience can enter into awareness only under the condition that it. . . be perceived, related, and ordered in terms
of a conceptual system and of its categories.
-Fromm, Psychoanalysisand Zen
Buddhism, in ZEN BUDDHISM AND
PSYCHOANALYSIS 99 (E. Fromm ed.
1970).
[P]hilosophers . . . have always paid a great deal of attention to ideas seen as the result of thought and observation;
but in modern times all too little attention has been paid
to the ideas which form the very instruments [of thought]
. . . . Indeed, it is often difficult to become aware of them
. . . just as you can see what is outside you, but cannot easily
see that with which you see, the eye itself.
-E. F. Schumacher, Small is
Beautiful 74 (1973).
INTRODUCTION

Bridging the gulf between "objective"

reason and

"subjective" value choice is a central problem for theories of
law and the social order. Roberto Unger has argued that conceptions of reason intrinsic to contemporary Western thought
prevent solution of this problem and that these conceptions are
a prison house from which legal theorists can and must escape.'
This article applies Unger's theme to the theory of judicial
reasoning. Following critical evaluation of contemporary
theory in Part One, Part Two suggests an alternative approach-a "decisionistic" perspective- and shows how it can
foster reconstruction of the theory of judicial reasoning.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee. B.A. 1958, LL.B. 1962,
Harvard University.
I See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & PoLITICs (1975); R. UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIErY
(1976).
Though the terms "judicial reasoning" and, where broader reference is warranted,
"judicial decision" are used throughout, it should be understood that the subject of
this article is appellate, rather than trial, process.
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PART ONE: CONTEMPORARY LEGAL THEORY
I.

PATTERNS OF EVASION

Contemporary theories of judicial reasoning rest on three
explanatory frameworks: formalism, intuitionism, and determinism. These frameworks, and corresponding theories of judicial reasoning, first will be examined individually. Since they
intermix in day-to-day thought about judicial reasoning, the
2
mixture then will be evaluated.
A. Formalism
In its accepted sense, "legal formalism" is the now discredited idea that judicial decision-making requires merely the
deductive application of pre-existing rules.' But by substituting, respectively, the terms "rational" and "principles" for
"deductive" and "rules," one arrives at a broader definition of
"formalism": "the rational application of pre-existing principles." 4 Far from being discredited, "formalism" in this second
sense5 approximates what is meant in current judicial thinking
by the term "lawfulness." The concept dominates two of the
most important contemporary approaches to the study of judicial reasoning-"analytical jurisprudence" and "the scholarly
tradition."
1. Analytical Jurisprudence
"Analytical jurisprudence," the branch of legal philosophy
2 See text accompanying notes 103-09 infra for analysis of a composite of the
theories.
The model of legal formalism reigned in America in the latter half of the 19th
century; see generally Horwitz, The Rise of Legal Formalism, 19 AM. J. LEGAL HisT..
251 (1975). The theory was deposed by the legal realists. See text accompanying notes
68-85 infra for a discussion of legal realism.
I The terms "rule" and "principle" have no uniformly accepted meaning. See,
e.g., note 41 infra for one disagreement concerning the terms. In this article,
"principle" is used in an inclusive sense that subsumes rule, propositions of purpose
or value, and precepts governing the identification and use of authority.
I Duncan Kennedy has shown the functional similarity between rule formalism
and a more inclusive sense of formalism. Kennedy, Legal Formality,2 J. LEGAL STUD.
351, 396-98 (1973) (arguing that purpose-based reasoning is "no less dependent on
rules" and "no less vulnerable to the dilemma of formality" than is traditional rule
formalism). See also text accompanying notes 21-30, 40-41, 53-61 infra stressing the
interconnectedness of rule and purpose.
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centered on the study of legal reasoning,' is based on the efforts
a "science of law."'7 Today, the
of John Austin to construct
8
"new analytical jurists" seek to document the theoretic
"fetters," 9 i.e., the pre-existing principles of rational decision,
that bind the judges. This attempt to construct a science of
judicial reasoning is, in one commentator's terms, an "almost
frantic"' 0 response to the crisis precipitated when the American
legal realists pointed out the ad hoc, value-based character of
judicial decision." This crisis can be termed the "value problem." One can see in the work of the new analytical jurists
three tactics for the defense of formalism: (a) minimization of
value choice; (b) ordering of values; and (c) isolation of value
choice.
a. Minimization of Value Choice
Among the leading works of the new analytical jurisprudence is H. L. A. Hart's The Concept of Law.' 2 The strategy of
minimization is embodied in Hart's position that, while
"doubt"' 3 and the consequent need for ad hoc weighing of interests'4 are inevitable in judicial decision, the application of
subjective value choice represents merely a "fringe of vagueness"' 5 surrounding a "core of certainty."' 6 Moreover, Hart
states that "preoccupation with the penumbra"' 7 is a misI While analytical jurisprudence may be viewed as but one school of thought
concerning judicial decision, it also signifies the branch of legal philosophy centered
on the study of legal reasoning. See generally J. STONE, LEGAL SYSTEM AND LAWYERS'
REASONINGS 16-20 (1964) (delineating as the three branches of jurisprudence: analytical
jurisprudence, theories of justice, and sociological jurisprudence).
7 See id. at 62-136.
' See generally Summers, The New Analytical Jurists, 41 N.Y.U. L. REv. 861
(1966).
0 See Greenawalt, Discretion and Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the
Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 359 (1975).
1,Hyman & Newhouse, Standardsfor PreferredFreedoms: Beyond the First, 60
Nw. L. REv. 1, 2 (1965).
11See text accompanying notes 68-85 infra for discussion of American legal realism.
11H. HART, THE CONcEFr OF LAW (1961).
13Id. at 119.
, Id. at 132.
"Id. at 120.
"Id. at 119.
" Hart, Positivilm and the Separationof Law and Morals, 71 I-HRv. L. Rav. 593,
614-15 (1958).
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take-one that has confused and obstructed the advance of
jurisprudence.18 This viewpoint signifies a strategy in which
"law," and so the science of law, can be understood to refer to
a "core of legal rules whose meaning is settled." 19 However, the
concept of minimization evades the reality that the uncertainties giving rise to the need for value choice are not penumbral
but endemic to judicial decision."

b. Ordering of Values
A second major figure of new analytical jurisprudence,
Ronald Dworkin, takes the strategy of minimization a step
'21
further. While acknowledging a penumbra of "hard cases,
Dworkin rejects Hart's concession that even a margin of ad hoc,
value-based decision need be accepted. 22 Indeed, much of the
energy of the new analytical jurists has been spent in intramural dispute as to whether there is or is not a penumbra of
"discretion" in judicial decision. 23
Arguing that even in "hard cases" judicial decision is to
be understood as the rational application of ascertainable principles, Dworkin acknowledges that "hard cases" require refer18Id.
" Id. at 614.
See also Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 Am.PHiL. Q. 151
(1971). Sartorius argues that, while on occasion "extra-legal" considerations such as
policy or value properly enter judicial reasoning, there are always "legal principles"
available to govern their use and, accordingly, "the judge is in all cases ultimately
guided by legal principles which severely limit, if they do not totally eliminate, his
discretion." Id.
2 The pervasiveness of conflict and uncertainty among principles of law was a
central finding of the legal realists that simply cannot be refuted. See, e.g., Mr. Justice
Holmes in Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908) (judicial
decision portrayed as a balancing of opposed principles); B. CARozo, THE NATURE OF
THE JUDICML PROcEss 40 (1921) (one principle or precedent often is matched by another
pointing to an opposite conclusion); K. LLEWELLYN, JUmISPRUDNCE 339 (1962) (our
"authoritatively accepted ways of dealing with authorities . . . is a body that allows
the court to select among anywhere from two to ten 'correct' alternatives in something
like eight or nine appealed cases out of ten"); Cohen, The Problems of a Functional
Jurisprudence, 1 MOD. L. REv. 5, 11 (1937) (cases often present "a plaintiff principle
and defendant principle" each opposing the other); Dickinson, The Law Behind the
Law: II, 29 COLUM. L. Rav. 285, 298 (1929) ("broad general principles of the law have
a significant habit of traveling in pairs of opposites").
21 See Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
2 Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REv.14, 32-40 (1967).
2 See Reynolds, Dworkin as Quixote, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 574, 576 (1975).
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ence to concepts of purpose or value (which Dworkin calls
"principle," distinct from "rule"), 4 and concedes that these
principles may conflict. But Dworkin's response is that such
conflicts can be rationally resolved by assessing the "relative
weight" of the respective principles.15 The judge is to identify
and give effect to the set of principles that, comprising the
community's "constitutional morality,""6 are "presupposed by
the laws and institutions of the community 27 and therefore are
inferable from those laws and institutions.2s The assumed
amenability of value principles to ordering inter se underlies
Dworkin's theory, just as it is implicit in the theory of Hans
Kelsen 5 and in other, more recent efforts to construct systematic accounts of judicial reasoning."
The strategy of ordering values exposes limitations inherent in the very goals of the new analytical jurists. Ronald Dworkin posits as the predicate for his theory a judge endowed with
superhuman capacities.31 This postulation is evidently based
on the assumption that the relevant question is whether an
adequate theory of nondiscretionary judicial decision is
theoretically possible. But the value problem arises because
the interpenetration of rule and value, and the unattainability
of a calculus of value,32 are givens of human reasoning.33 The
new analytical jurisprudence thus seems to conceive its task in
terms 34 that sanction evasion of the very realities, brought to
light by the legal realists, that lie at the root of the value
problem.
24

Dworkin, supra note 22, at 22-29.

21Id. at 27.

21Dworkin, supra note 21, at 1105.
v Id.

21Id. at 1106-07.
" See J. STONE, supra note 6, at 125-31.
" See, e.g., G. GoruaTa, THa LOGIC OF CHOICE 161-66 (1968).
1, Dworkin, supra note 21, at 1083. "Hercules," the judge-protagonist of Dworkin's
theory, is "a lawyer of superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen." Id. Accordingly, he is qualified to ascertain and reason from "the community's moral traditions"
in fixing the "legal rights" of the parties. Id. at 1104.
'2 See text accompanying notes 59-61 infra discussing this unattainability.
31 As Julius Stone observed in criticism of Hans Kelsen's pure theory of law,
"impurities" and uncertainties are intrinsic to the application of law by human beings.
See J. STONE, supra note 6, at 125-31.
31For a further discussion of these terms, see text accompanying notes 121-25
infra.
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c. Isolating Value Choice
A third strategy in defense of formalism 35 is to isolate the
realm of rule from the realm of value choice, thereby preserving
the integrity of the former. This method is perhaps most explicitly developed in Richard Wasserstrom's The Judicial
Decision,31 another major work of the new analytical jurisprudence.
Addressing the value problem, Wasserstrom proposes a
two-level model of judicial reasoning. At the first level, a controlling legal rule is applied according to "canons of logic" ;37
the second level requires a demonstration that the rule is
"conducive to the production of socially desirable consequences. '38 Wasserstrom presents this two-level approach as a
reconciliation of ad hoc value-based decision posited by the
legal realists with the ideal of law as pre-existing principle.3 9
The mechanism of isolation ignores the reality that, as
George Christie has written," statements of rule cannot be
sharply distinguished from statements of purpose or value.
Such a distinction also presents problems of judicial application inasmuch as rules and values must be applied together,
not separately."
2.

The Scholarly Tradition

While analytical jurisprudence seeks, systematic description of the principles which govern judicial decision, the scholarly tradition seeks standards of quality and validity to direct
the appraisal of individual decisions. Like the analytical jurists, the scholars view judicial decision as essentially the rational application of ascertainable principle and are therefore
equally challenged by the value problem. Their response is a
11It has been seen that the distinction between rules, on the one hand, and
purpose or value propositions, on the other, is basic to the taxonomy of Hart. See notes
12-19 and accompanying text supra; Sartorius, supra note 19.
36 R. WASSERSTROM, THE JUDici DECISION (1961).
3' Id. at 172.
3'Id. at 173.
11 See id. at 91-96, 138-51.

Christie, The Model of Principles, 1968 DUKE L.J. 649.
Id. at 668. Christie shows the untenability of Dworkin's distinction between
rules and principles. Id. at 655-67. See text accompanying note 24 supra concerning
Dworkin's use of these terms.
40

"
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defense of formalism that rests on the same three strategies just
examined.
a. Minimization of Value Choice
When Herbert Wechsler, in one of the seminal works of the
scholarly tradition, issued a call for "neutral principles" of
constitutional law,42 he acknowledged that constitutional decision often is "political" in the sense that it requires choice
among conflicting values.4 3 However, theories" are identified
not by all the propositions they acknowledge to be true but by
those they choose to emphasize.
The emphasis of the scholarly tradition has been critique
of judicial decision according to canons of "reasoned elaboration"4 whereby quality and validity are functions of
"thoroughness, soundness, clarity and internal consistency.""
This pursuit yields a body of criticism reflecting two assumptions. The first assumption is that if one can logically demon" Wechsler, Toward NeutralPrinciplesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARv. L. Ray.
1 (1959). Wechsler notes that the development of "neutral principles" of constitutional
law is as necessary for adequate scholarly critique of decision as it is for adequate
decision-making itself. Id. at 11.
Throughout this article no attempt is made to distinguish constitutional cases
from other kinds of judicial decision. It is assumed that although the subject of Wechsler's article is constitutional law, he expresses conceptions of judicial decision and
critique that are part of a scholarly tradition applicable to judicial decision generally.
See also note 43 infra for further comment on the underlying similarity of constitutional, statutory, and common law decision.
4 Id. at 15.
It is true that the value problem presented by constitutional cases is particularly
acute because courts are left with little guidance from the Constitution-a brief document of long duration. Further, constitutional decisions often involve matters of great
social importance, and, in the case of the United States Supreme Court, are not subject
to reversal by another branch. However, with respect to the underlying value problem,
these are differences of degree and not of kind. The dilemma of rule and value inheres
in judicial decision-whether the question involves common law, statute, or constitution. See also Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
Rav. 1281, 1314 (1976) (arguing the similarity of the judicial function in constitutional
and public law litigation).
" "Theory," as the term is used in this article, may mean either an explicit and
carefully articulated system of explanation, such as the theories analytical jurisprudence seeks to build, or an aggregation of incompletely examined ideas and assumptions. The scholarly tradition is best understood as a theory of the second type.
4 See generally White, The Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration:Jurisprudential
Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REv. 279, 286 (1973). See text accompanying
notes 56-58 infra for an expanded view of "reasoned elaboration."
" White, supra note 45, at 290.
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strate faults in the reasoning of a judicial opinion, the opinion
is defective. The second assumption is that having shown an
opinion to be defective is to have demonstrated it to be doctrinally incorrect. The meta-assumption, then, is that by rigor of
critical analysis doctrinal disagreement can be cut through and
resolved.
While obviously an essential enterprise,47 the limited effectiveness of this approach can be noted even in its own terms."
The belief that "a clear dividing line can be drawn between
good and bad reasoned elaboration"49 threatens to "re-bury"
the realities of uncertainty and value choice which took "nearly
a century to uncover.""0 The assumptions underlying this approach not only minimize the value problem, but, in effect,
evade it.' Another strategy that minimizes value choice is
embodied in the rather widely held assumption that the best
response to very hard cases (or issues) may be to refrain from
making a decision.52 While this principle of judicial restraint is
no more "wrong" than the standard of reasoned elaboration, it,
,"
See, e.g., note 48 and text accompanying notes 108-09 infra for a discussion of
the utility of such critical analysis.
" In the same journal issue as that in which Wechsler's "neutral principles"
article appeared, supra note 42, Henry Hart offered as a model of more adequate
scholarly criticism 20 closely-reasoned pages of critical "laboratory analysis" of the
Supreme Court's decision in Irvin v. Dowd, 359 U.S. 394 (1959). Hart, The Time Chart
of the Justices, 73 HARv. L. Rav. 84, 101-22 (1959). It seems a sobering indication of
the limitations intrinsic to such an effort to transcend doctrinal disagreement by rigor
of analysis that an eminent and otherwise sympathetic colleague of Hart's was forced
to conclude that the critique was "too labored, too argumentative" to be effective.
Griswold, Of Time and Attitudes-ProfessorHart and Judge Arnold, 74 HARv. L. Rxv.
81, 83 (1960).
Obviously critiques such as Hart's serve a valuable monitoring function. They are
the means by which the critics strive to keep the courts "honest." See Preface to THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUIrON at viii (P. Kurland ed. 1965). On the other hand,
one must recognize the extent to which scholarly critiques are like the remonstrances
of a tenth justice, whose opinion, while couched in terms of neutral standards of
craftsmanship, does not rise far above the doctrinal disagreements that divide the
other nine. Cf. notes 61, 104 infra for examples of the impact of this tenth judge.
" J. STONE, supra note 6, at 317.
"Id.
5,As demonstrated by Julius Stone, the scholarly tradition imports a search for
ways of "minimizing if not eliminating conflicts of policy among judges." J. STONE,
SOCIAL DIMNSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 679 (1966).
5 Thus, Alexander Bickel's "passive virtues" give expression to the broader precept that "reasoned elaboration" cannot occur, and so judicial intervention is not
appropriate, in instances of extreme uncertainty. See White, supra note 45, at 290-92.
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too, signifies a strategy for evading rather than confronting the
value problem.
b.

Ordering of Values

Questioning the adequacy of much scholarly criticism,-s
John Hart Ely argues that scholars have neglected the role of
value in constitutional5 4 decision. What is needed, Ely states,
is criticism identifying "misperceptions" of, and "unjustifiable
inferences" drawn from, the "value structure set forth" in the
Constitution.5 5 Ely thus invokes the strand of the scholarly
tradition emphasizing interpretation of rules according to the
values or purposes that underlie them.
The charter for such reasoning is set out in Henry Hart and
5 Hart and Sacks portray juAlbert Sacks' The Legal Process.
dicial decision as "rational applications of the shared purposes" implicit in the "social order. 5 7 Tracing these purposes
to the particulars of case and statutory law, the judicial process
achieves "reasoned resolution" by means which include judgments that express the "validity" and "ranking" of human
58
purposes.
Reasoning from purpose is, of course, an essential of sound
judicial decision. However, as Duncan Kennedy has argued,
theory predicating a "[value-]neutral calculus"59 of purpose
presents essentially the same problems as does rule formalism.6" That is, the value problem arises because the sources of
law are indeterminate, and the ideal of an order of purposes,
no less than the ideal of an order of rules, does not adequately
confront that indeterminacy."
'3 Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf, A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920,
944 (1973). Professor Ely's faulting of scholarly critique for its lack of intellectual rigor
is remarkably similar to Henry Hart's observations 14 years earlier. Hart, supra note
48, at 125.
" See notes 42-43 supra where it is noted that constitutional decision presents a
value problem different only in degree, and not in kind, from that present in other
cases.
"Id.

H. HArT & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS (tent. ed. 1958).
Id. at 668-69.

"Id. at 122.
,Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAav. L. Rv.

1685, 1685 (1976).
0 See note 5 supra for a discussion of the similarity between rule formalism and
more inclusive formalism.
11Professor Ely feels safe in asserting that Roe v. Wade was wrongly decided
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Isolating Value Choice

Seeking norms to guide an activist United States Supreme
Court, Alexander M. Bickel came to stress self-restraint in
choice of "whether, when, and how much to adjudicate. 6 2 In
Bickel's view, such choice is a function not of principled adjudication but of expedience.13 Broadly developing this principleexpedience dichotomy, Bickel posits a realm of rational principle that the courts apply but must compromise and even contravene when expedience dictates self-restraint.6 4
because he finds it obvious that the purported right there vindicated is based on no
"value inferable from the Constitution" and "lacks connection with any value the
Constitution marks as special." Ely, supra note 53, at 933, 949. But this assertion does
not appear to lift Ely appreciably above the fray of doctrinal disagreement; nor are
other efforts to transcend doctrinal disagreement through value analysis any more
successful. See, e.g., R. MCCLOSKEY, THE

MODERN

SUPREME COURT 290-321 (1972), and

Velvel, Suggested Approaches to ConstitutionalAdjudication and Apportionment, 12
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1381 (1965), in which each author posits a value-explicit protocol for
analysis and purports to reason objectively to a conclusion. McCloskey's conclusion is
that the state aid to religion decisions are wrong; Velvel's that the apportionment
decisions are correct.
While attention to value structures and value reasoning provides a very useful
critical perspective, assertion of one's own value premises does not address the value
problem posed to critics-which is: How there can be agreement about quality or
adequacy of reasoning, while there is disagreement on value or doctrine?
Nor would it seem unreasonable to guess that the difficulty of achieving a
"calculus of value" explains in part why, despite the immense note it received, Hart
and Sacks' The Legal Process, supra, note 56, never was developed beyond a first
"tentative" edition. The difficulty seems reflected further in Henry Hart's own apparent ambivalence about opening the doors to judicial concern with policy, see J. STONE,
supra note 6, at 318, and in the disappointing outcome of the 1963 Holmes lectures
where Hart, having sought to show the relation between fact and value, had to admit
on the eve of the very last lecture that the argument failed and that the truth he sought
eluded him. See Bok, [In Memoriam to] Henry M. Hart, Jr., 82 HARv. L. REv. 1592,
1591 (1969).
'2 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 197 (1962).
0 Id. at 184-98. See also note 64 infra for a further analysis of "expedience."
',Such an approach has been termed "100% insistence on principle 20% of the
time." Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the Passive Virtues-A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in JudicialReview, 64 CoLUM. L. Rxv. 1, 3 (1964). For example, Bickel
characterizes the judicial aftermath of Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
as an adjustment between "principle," on the one hand, and "expedience," on the
other. A. BICKEL, supra note 62, at 187. Bickel asserts that an expedience-based
"contravention of [the] principle" of Brown occurred when the courts upheld the
constitutionality of race-based pupil assignments aimed at decreasing de facto racial
segregation in the schools. Id.
As reflected in this formulation, Bickel steadfastly holds to the need for
,'principle" susceptible of unconflicted statement and application. In this view, the
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What is here explicitly developed in a theory of constitutional review is an assumption basic to conventional perception
of judicial decision. This assumption is that "law" and
"policy" are two separate realms;65 that judges are to function
in a realm characterized by rational application of principle
and shift to ad hoc value-based decision in "emergencies." 6
Rigorous enough to reflect this assumption expressly in his
theory of constitutional decision, and progressively disenchanted with the resulting realm of "principle," Bickel turned
increasingly away from that realm, toward the expediencebased ideals of a political jurisprudence. 7
principle of Brown must be a general command that the states not discriminate on the
basis of race. Thus:
That there should be no distinctions of race ordained by the state-that is a
principle. That there should be no distinctions of race ordained by the state
except when their consequence may be that the racial prejudices of the
people are mitigated in the long run-that comes in the end only to this: that
the state should try, in the ways best suited to prevailing conditions, to draw
the races into a closer relationship. And this, in turn, is not a principled rule
of behavior; it is the statement of a goal whose attainment will call for a great
many prudential judgments, aimed at the goal, to be sure, but not proceeding immediately from principle.
Id. at 63. Herbert Wechsler's conception of "principle"-espoused in his "neutral
principles" thesis, see note 42 supra-was similar with respect to the rigor and the
clarity of meaning judicial "principle" must achieve. See Wechsler, The Nature of
Judicial Reasoning, in LAW AND PmosoPHY 290, 295 (S. Hook ed. 1964) (discussing
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948)); Wechsler, supranote 42, at 31-34 (discussing
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
However, such conceptions of principle misconceive the judicial function. Levi
notes that "the value of court action" as opposed to legislative action "is that the
matter can be taken one step at a time." Levi, The Nature of JudicialReasoning in
LAw AND PHILOSOPHY 263, 274 (S.Hook ed. 1964). This suggests that the principles
enunciated and followed in judicial decision characteristicallyleave the future course
unclear. Furthermore, judicial principles conflict. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer:
Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 473-96 (1962). Finally, despite Bickel's
contrary view, judicial principles intermix purpose and value propositions.
See Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision-Making, 77 YALE L.J. 411, 427 (1968).
" See F. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS 31 (1959); Cohen, Field
Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 259-60 (1950). Such dichotomization
between rule and value gives rise to a "continual oscillation" between rule application
and value-based ad hoc decision in our thought about judicial decision. See
KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS, supra note 1, at 99; see also note 142 infra.
I See text at notes 86-102 infra in which political jurisprudence is discussed.
Doubting the viability of a lawfulness based on clear principles rationally applied,
Bickel turned to the ideal of pluralism-the counterbalancing of competing elements
in society. See generally Purcell, Alexander Bickel and the Post-Realist Constitution,
11 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 521 (1976). But, as shown in the discussion of political
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In these ways, then, both analytical jurisprudence and the
scholarly tradition, seeking to defend the formalist assumption
that judicial decision is essentially rational application of preexisting principle, evade the value problem.
B.

Intuitionism

In presenting their purpose-based theory of judicial reasoning, Hart and Sacks concede that an intuitive "act of judgment" is an irreducible feature of such reasoning." Though
indorporating intuitionism, their theory seeks to minimize it."
This section considers a -theory centered on intuitionism-the
theory of legal realism. While identified with a movement
largely spent by 1940,10 the tradition of legal realism still influences thought about judicial decision. Attacking the belief that
judicial decision requires merely deductive application of preexisting rules,7 ' the realists stressed that precedents are 'an
ambiguous, malleable resource for the judge. 2 The realists'
central point was that the formalist myth conceals realities of
judicial policy-making, 3 and that the primary goal is to
unearth those realities."
jurisprudence, this framework is not responsive to the value problem. See text accompanying notes 97-102 infra. See also Purcell, supra at 559-63.
" H. HART & A. SACKS, supranote 56, at 123; see text accompanying notes 56-58
supra for a discussion of their purpose-based theory.
1,Intuition occurs in the interstices of a system of common law that, subject only
to "limits fixed by established remedies. . .[,] provides a comprehensive, underlying
body of law adequate for the resolution of all the disputes that may arise within the
social order." H. HART & A. SACKS, supra note 56, at 669.
70 See generally W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REAmsSM 238-39 (1968).
7 See notes 3-5 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of this deductive
belief.
11See, e.g., Levi, The Natural Law, Precedent, and Thurman Arnold, 24 VA. L.
REv. 587, 603 (1938).
11 For example, Mr. Justice Holmes stated that considerations of purpose and
value are central to judicial decision, O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe
ed. 1963), and that to be blind to such considerations is "to leave the very ground and
foundation of judgments inarticulate and often unconscious." Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARv. L. Rav. 457, 467 (1897). See also B. CAlDozo, supra note 20, at 112.
1' See note 73 supra for sources which discuss these realities. It has been noted
that Judge Cardozo's chief contribution to the philosophy of law was that, as judge,
"he brought the articulation of values into his juristic writings and judicial opinions.
He not only made explicit the problems of value implicit in legal doctrines; he also
showed how making them explicit made the judge more conscious and more worthy of
his function." Patterson, Cardozo'sPhilosophy of Law: II, 88 U. PA. L. Rav. 156, 165
j1939).
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This emphasis on value-based decision led to the view
that judicial decision is neither a matter of following rules laid
down by past courts nor of enunciating rules for future courts
to follow. Instead, the function of judicial decision is to find
justice, the right decision, in the particularcase. 75 The resulting model accords a central place to judicial intuition conceived as "sovereign prerogative, 7 the judicial sense of
"Justice-for-All-of-Us, '7 or one of a variety of other intuition78
centered constructs.

If a concept as nebulous as "intuition" is an inadequate
foundation for a theory of judicial reasoning, the explanation
is that the realists were intent not on a constructing but on
destroying theory. 79 The legal realists identified theory with the
ideology of conventional perception and sought to jettison
those orthodoxies in order to see things as they really are."0 For
Misgivings developed about such an explicit charter for policy-based judicial reasoning. See note 84 infra. See also Karl Llewellyn's evidently normative assumption
that "the weak judge" is to be "penned within the walls his predecessors built"-and

that only "the strong judge" is to scale those walls. K.

LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH

74 (1960).

11See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 277 (1931). There is a close
functional connection between intuitionism and the ideal of "particular justice." See
R.

supra note 36, at 91.
10
0. W. HoLMES, Law in Science and Science in Law, in COLLEcTED LEGAL PAPERS
239 (1920), quoted in E. RosTow, THE SOVEREIGN PREROGATWIE at xiii (1962).
WASERSTROM,

LLEWELLYN, supra note 20, at 339.
E.g., "the conviction in the judicial mind" that the decision will have "led to
justice," B. CARDOZO, supra note 20, at 41; the 'subjective sense of justice inherent in
the judge,"' J. FRANK, supra note 75, at 281 (citation and emphasis omitted); or an
"intuitive sense of what is right," Hutcheson, The Judgment Intuitive: The Function
of the "Hunch" in JudicialDecision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274, 285 (1928).
71See Rumble, The Paradox of American Legal Realism, 75 INT'L. J. OF ETHIcs
166, 173-76 (1965).
U The need was to sweep away the "useless menagerie of metaphysical monsters,"
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLum. L. REV.
809, 829 (1935) (quoting RuSSELL, MYSTICISM AND LOGIC 155 n.50 (1918)), inherent in
orthodox ideology about judicial decision, in order to "[s]ee it fresh . . .[s]ee it as
it works." K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 508 (1960).
A spirit of reductivist dogmatism pervaded the legal realist movement. For example, Justice Holmes, espousing his "bad man" theory of the law, stated that "a contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do not keep
it, and nothing else. " Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897)
(emphasis added). This wish to de-mythologize the law gave rise to a spirit of
"corrosive analysis and inspired destruction," McDougal, The Law School of the Future: From Legal Realism to Policy Science in the World Community, 56 YALE L.J.
1345, 1349 (1947), that did not lend itself to the historicism and the openness to other
"
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the realists, "things as they really are" present to the judge a
pluralistic reality-a reality of irreducible conflict among
sources of the law that can be resolved only through intuitive
decision.8 '
The legacy of legal realism is strong today. Its perspective
is preserved, for example, in the leading law school primer on
judicial reasoning-E. H. Levi's An Introduction to Legal
Reasoning.82 Levi portrays judicial decision in terms of organic
growth in the law whereby the "concepts" that express the law
change in response to changed conditions in society.8 While
Levi does not use the term, it is implicit in his model that
judicial "intuition" is validated as the vehicle by which the
judge registers and implem6nts in law the changed "concepts"
of society. 4 The legacy of legal realism is also visible in "rule
skepticism"-a predisposition to doubt the importance of rule
following and rule formulation in judicial decision."
perspectives that is necessary if new inquiry is to build on old. See Llewellyn, Adler,
& Cook, Law and the Modern Mind: A Symposium, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 82, 94-95, 10708 (1931) (attributing to the realists a dogmatism blind to the pluralistic character of
inquiry); Yntema, The American Legal Realism in Retrospect, 14 VAND. L. Rav. 317,
328 (1960) (attributing to the realists "anti-historicism and insularity").
8, Just as intuitionism is tied closely to the ideal of "particular justice," it is also
tied to a pluralistic view of the sources of law. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 34
(1971) (contrasting systematic theories of justice with the "intuitionist-pluralist"
perspective).
"E. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948).
9 Id. at 6, 8.
" Levi's model makes "concepts"-such as "consideration," "trespass," and
"fixtures," Levi, supra note 72, at 604,-the main vehicles of the law, rather than rules
or principles. In this emphasis he follows the model of Max Radin-a model set out in
what Karl Llewellyn called "the most accessible study on judges' thinking that is in
print in English." Llewellyn, Book Review (C. MoIus, How LAWYERS THINK), 51 HARv.
L. REv. 757, 759 (1938). Radin portrays judicial decision as a selection between "several
categories [that] struggle . . . for the privilege of framing the situation before the
judge." Radin, The Theory of JudicialDecision: or How Judges Think, 11 A.B.A.J.
357, 359 (1925). He asserts that 'principles' are not principles at all but aggregations
of type transactions, schematized to make them easier to carry in one's memory." Id.
at 360. See also the conceptions "type situation" and "situation-sense" basic to the
account of judicial decision in K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITMON (1960).
The problem, however, is that such a picture of judicial decision affords no normative guidance for judicial deliberation-policy-oriented or otherwise. In some measure,
indeed, it seems to presuppose a judiciary unaware of the dynamics of the decision
process. Thus, the context gives no reason to think Levi was facetious (nor, for that
matter, aware of the enormity of the position to which his theory brought him) when
he suggested that judges "should not be particularly bright," lest they become too
aware of their opportunity to change law freely. Levi, supra note 72, at 608.
See Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Sociez Change, 19 STAN. L. REv.
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The principal legacy of legal realism, in sum, is a set of
antitheoretical, intuitional themes prevalent in modern
thought about judicial reasoning. In this aspect, legal realism
joins forces with the scholarly tradition of formalism. Each
manifests a well-formed branch in the dichotomy of rule and
value. Together they are a prodigious force perpetuating the
value problem.
C.

Determinism

The term "political jurisprudence" describes two deterministic modes of thought about judicial decision." These will
be called "personalistic determinism" and "institutional determinism."
1.

PersonalisticDeterminism

Intuitionism is one of the legacies of the legal realist move-

ment; "judicial behaviorism" is another.87 Proceeding on the
legal realist assumption that judicial decision is a function not
of rule but of human value judgment, judicial behaviorism
searches for the causes which govern decision. Biographical,
ideological, and similar aspects of the life and character of the
judge are viewed as cause and the decision as effect.8

Not only is judicial judgment thus rendered "lawful" in
the same sense that all causally explicable phenomena are lawful, it is made predictable as well. Moreover, if, as the legal
786, 789 (1967) (attributing "rule Skepticism" to the legal realists and noting its
importance in the law school of today).
It is true that Karl Llewellyn, a leading figure of legal realism, finally attached
much significance to rule-following and rule-formulation in judicial decision.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmoN 38 (1960) (describing the "Grand Style"
("the best style," id. at 37) of judicial decision as the "on-going production and improvement of rules."). However, Llewellyn's lengthy description of the Grand Style
does not add much to the understanding of such a rule-making function. See J. STONE,
supra note 6, at 321-22. The resulting picture still overplays the judge's "sixth sense
for right and justice" and so fails to come to terms with "the hard facts of judicial
subjectivity." Clark & Trubek, Book Review (K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION), 71 YALE L.J. 255, at 264 and 270 (1961) (emphasis omitted).
" See generally Shapiro, PoliticalJurisprudence,52 Ky. L.J. 294, 307-16 (1964).
0 For an overview, see Danelski, Toward Explanation of JudicialBehavior,42 U.
CN. L. REv. 659 (1973).
u Although the results often may be couched in terms only of statistical correlation between independent variables (characteristics of the judge) and dependent variables (decision), the implication of cause and effect is generally evident.
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realists maintain, the law is what judges decide it to be, 9 the
key to systematic statement of "the law" is systematic prediction of what judges will decide.
While judicial behaviorism can help society understand
and improve the judicial function," the theory poses profound
questions of legitimacy. Thus, basic to the very definition of
judicial law is that it transcend the character and prejudices
of the deciding judge. For foundations in legitimacy, political
jurisprudence depends on its second branch, institutional determinism.
2. InstitutionalDeterminism
Institutional determinism is grounded in political
theory-viewing courts as part of a system that subjects all
organs of government to public control. The most graphic paradigm for this arrangement is cybernetics, in which information,
action, and reaction make the parts of a system one functionally coherent whole."1
Legitimation of the judicial function rests on forces that
cause courts to reflect public needs and wishes.92 While the
means may be as direct as the selection of judges by election
or appointment, 3 there is, especially in the case of constitutional law,94 a more amorphous set of processes whereby a
"dominant alliance" or "successful coalition" of the.public
keeps the courts responsive to its wishes.95 These processes may
be tied to personalistic determinism, as in the case of
"mechanisms of internalization" by which judges come to ab"

See, e.g.,

LLEWELLYN,

supra note 74, at 12, 52.

If nothing else, behaviorist analysis should make judges more sensitive to fact
and value assumptions that underlie their thought and decision.
,' See D'Amato, Towards a Reconciliationof Positivism and Naturalism:A Cybernetic Approach to a Problem of Jurisprudence,14 W. ONT. L. REv. 171 (1975).
"

12 See

generally G.

SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL POLICY-MAKING

(1965).

The emergence of the Warren Court, for example, is attributed to Presidential
politics of the period 1928-1968. G. SCHUBERT, THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLICY 180 (1970).
While much attention focuses on constitutional review and the United States
Supreme Court, the resulting picture of the judicial function extends to other courts
and other areas of decision as well. See note 43 supra for further discussion.
11See note 93 supra concerning cases arising outside the area of constitutional law.
Is Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National
Policy-maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285, 293-94 (1957).
"
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sorb the "community consensus" or the "community
agenda.""8
Although institutional determinism can contribute to improving the judicial function,9" it is not responsive to the value
problem. For political jurisprudence, quality, and legitimacy in
judicial decision is a matter of success in anticipating the needs
or wishes of the public. 8 But to rest one's theory on political
"success" is to evade the value problem. Political jurisprudence holds that while judicial decisions are to be made and
appraised on the basis of instrumental reasonings, published
opinions are to be cast in terms of traditional legal principle.
The result is theory that provides little guidance for the critique of judicial reasonings."' ° More than this, the assumption
that theories of validity and legitimacy can rest on the purportedly value-neutral criterion of "success" covers up the simple
fact that109there is disagreement about the meaning of
"success."
The value problem challenges political theory to
" Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections
Between Law and Political Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 259 (1968).
"7 Institutional determinism lends itself especially well to important growing conceptions of the role of dialogue among the court, the legislature, and the public. See,
e.g., Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 IARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 269, 302-05 (1975);
White supra note 45, at 294-98. It also supports analysis of the allocation of functions
between the judiciary and other organs of government. See, e.g., Howard, Adjudication
Considered as a Process of Conflict Resolution: A Variationon Separation of Powers,
18 J. PuB. L. 339 (1969).
" See, e.g., -Editors'Preface to Deutsch, Precedent and Adjudication,83 YALE L.J.
1553-54 (1974).
" See, e.g., C. MiLLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HisTORY (1969).
Miller describes at some length value principles that he acknowledges comprise the
"human reasons" for decision. Id. at 28-37. But he sharply distinguishes these from
the legitimate "principles . . . [of] legal reasoning" in which judicial opinions are to
be couched. Id. at 15-20, 28.
Such a failure to reconcile instrumental with rule-based reasoning is but another
symptom of the value problem. If one posits that the instrumental reasonings are the
decisive ones, then the point of Roberto Unger obtains: Where based only on instrumental reasoning, judicial decision becomes indistinguishable from other political
decision-making. See KNOWLEDGE & PoLrrlcs supranote 1, at 99-100. Cf. note 100 infra
regarding the criterion of "success" as it relates to judicial decision-making.
'1 If the criterion is "success," neither decision-maker nor critic can know the
quality of a given decision since neither can know whether it will eventually succeed.
"' For illustration of this point consider the instrumental posture of Alexander
Bickel. See text accompanying notes 62-67 supra. Having concluded that the Warren
Court did not stray outside a "broad avenue" of leeways open to the Court, A. BIcKEL,
TuE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 42 (1970), Bickel asserts that "the
Warren Court's noblest enterprise-school desegregation-and its most popular enter-
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seek modes of reasoning that confront, rather than evade, value
disagreement. '
II.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF EVASION

Contemporary theories of judicial reasoning evade the
value problem. But since these theories intermix in the study
of judicial decision, may not the whole be greater than the sum
of the parts? May we have in fact an adequate composite
theory?
To answer this, one must decide what "adequacy" in
theory means. What are theories of judicial reasoning supposed
to do? In partial answer, I suggest that our theories should
provide guidance to the judiciary," 3 legitimate the judicial
function, and provide instruction for advocates. I suggest, further, that the inadequacy of the composite is manifest in its
failure to achieve those ends.
A shortcoming of all the theories considered is that they
provide limited guidance to judges. This deficiency is true even
of the work of the scholarly tradition which purports to speak
directly to the judges.'"4
The reason for this situation is evident. While academics
respond to the value problem in large part by evasion, the
judges must resolve it daily in decision. The result is academic
theory unnresponsive to the core problem encountered in judicial practice. Such a gap between theory and practice is the
very paradigm of inadequacy in theory.
prise-reapportionment-not to speak of school-prayer cases and those concerning aid
to parochial schools, are heading toward obsolescence, and in large measure abandonment." Id. at 173. Bickel makes this assertion as though oblivious to the contingent
factual beliefs and subjective value beliefs that underlie it. Value judgment tends to
slip from view when, as is done so often in the United States, events are described in
terms of "success" and "failure."
,M2
See generally E.PURCELL, THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1973).
,03
By extension this includes providing "guidance" to the other branches of government and to private groups whose action may affect the operation of the courts.
See note 228 infra.
I" The difficulty, as already noted, is that the theory of "reasoned elaboration"
receives expression in scholarly critiques that do not greatly transcend the doctrinal
disagreements that divide the judges themselves. Two notable judges have had occasion to assert the limited utility of much of this reasoned elaboration critique. See
Traynor, No Magic Words Could Do it Justice, 49 C~uF. L. REv. 615, 623 (1961);
Wright, Professor Bickel, the Scholarly Tradition, and the Supreme Court, 84 HARv.
L. REv. 769, 778-79 (1971).
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The value problem-the problem of reconciling law and
value choice-is the central challenge for theory seeking to legitimate the judicial function in a democratic society. Evasion
of this problem, characteristic of each of the perspectives examined, has gone hand-in-hand with tacit sponsoring of the
myth of simple legal formalism.0 5 To the extent the public now
is presented a theory for the legitimacy of the judicial function,' 6 it is the palpable fiction that judicial decision is the
application of ascertainable rules.' 7
The best case for our theories can be made in connection
with the training of advocates.' 8 The precepts of the scholarly
tradition, emphasizing rigorous examination of judicial reasoning, prepare students to refute the work of other minds and to
lay before the court reasonings that are the "opinion kernels"
of favorable decision.' 9 The perspective of legal realism prepares students to understand and persuade the judge as a
human being. But the consequences of the value problem are
manifest also here-as the divorce between published reasonings and the actual grounds of decision presents a barrier to
'' See note 107 infra for further discussion of this myth.
" In fact, the public doubtless is schizophrenic about the judicial function-in
certain contexts cynically assuming that judges decide whatever they wish, while in
other contexts embracing the orthodoxy that ours is a "government of laws, not men."
"$Those engaged in public discourse about the law must choose between the
"risks of candor"-the risks of admitting the extent of uncertainty and of value choice
in judicial decision-and the "risks of deception." Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action,
14 STAN. L. REv. 3, 58 (1961). Strategies for evasion of the value problem are subject
to the latter set of risks. Indeed, some commentators have been frank enough to
advocate deception as the preferable alternative. See, e.g., T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLs
OF GOVERNMENT 33-45 (1935) (arguing the necessity of preserving public faith in the

vision of a judiciary governed by laws, not men); J. FRANK, supra note 75, at 35 (citing

disapprovingly an instance of explicit advocacy of perpetuation of the myth); D. WIGDoR, Roscoe PouND 189 (1974) (citing instance of "several prominent law school deans"

advocating continuance of the myth); Shapiro, The Supreme Court and Constitutional
Adjudication: Of Politics and Neutral Principles, 31 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 587, 601
(1963) ("politics is the art of the possible. . . .If the myth of the Court is destroyed
in the law schools, the Court loses power. Surely this is an important truth to be
taught, perhaps a more important truth than that about the discretionary role of
judges."); Shuman, Legalism: Asset, Nuisance, Necessary Evil or illusion?, 19 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 59-60 (1966). The conflict between deception and the theory of democracy
is yet another difficulty presented by the value problem.
'" This circumstance doubtless is related to the fact that education is the principal activity of those formulating the theories.
'" See K. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 241 (1960).
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effective communication, and to the desired partnership, between judge and advocate.
PART TWO: RECONSTRUCTION
I. THE ROOTS OF THE PROBLEM
Drawing on the recent work of Roberto Unger,"' Section I
of Part Two presents a two-fold thesis. First, the inefficacy of
our theories of judicial reasoning is due to the inadequacy of
the modalities of explanation that underlie them. Second, it is
necessary and feasible to free ourselves from these modalities,
as a major step toward more adequate theories of judicial reasoning.
The "Cartesian revolution""' instated two assumptions
concerning man and nature which still dominate Western
thought. One assumption is that there is an "unbridgeable
gulf" between reason and desire."12 The second assumption is

that the way to understand a phenomenon is by analyzing it:
identifying and studying its parts."3
Both assumptions underpin contemporary thought and
technologies."' Both assumptions have been challenged,"' but,
as Unger observes, these challenges have been only "partial
criticisms";115 they have not attacked the "prison house" of

Western thought"7 at its foundations.

110
KNOWLEDGE
note 1.
"IH. THAYER,
112 PERELMAN

& POLITICS, supra note 1. See also LAW IN MODERN SOcmmrY supra
MEANING AND AC71ON: A CRmcAL HISTORY OF PRAGMATISM 18 (1968).
& OLBRECHTS-TYTECA, THE NEW RHETORIC: A TREATISE ON

ARGUMENTATION 512 (1969) [hereinafter cited
11 H. THAYER, supra note 111, at 17.

as

TREATISE].

"' The tradition of thought that is the subject of this section, and of Unger's
critique, is the "liberal" tradition comprising a set of psychological, philosophical and
political beliefs founded on the primacy of the individual and the reason-will split.
While this tradition excludes romanticist and collectivist strands of contemporary
thought, see KNOWLEDGE & POLITrCS, supra note 1, at 82, the liberal tradition sufficiently dominates thought and institutions to warrant identifications as
"contemporary" or "modem" Western thought in the text.
"' For example, in the holistic theories of gestalt psychology and structuralism.
KNOWLEDGE & POLmCS, supra note 1, at 47. See also id. at 125-29 (structuralism). Such
holism receives broadest theoretic expression in L. vON BERTALANFFY, PERSPECTIVES ON
A GENERAL SYSTEM THEORY (1975) (presenting general systems theory as "a new paradigm for the development of theories," id. at 12 (emphasis omitted)).
"' KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS, supra note 1, at 105.
I Id. at 3. 'Thus, the house of reason in which I was working proved to be a
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Unger has undertaken "total criticism" of the "deep structure" of our thought. ' His thesis is that Western
thought-psychological, sociological, and political-is riven by
antinomy between "universals" and "particulars," and that to
escape the prison house we must overcome this fragmentation
of our thought. '
Unger posits three basal manifestations ' of the antinomy,
in each of which a "universal"-abstract, objective, knowable-is matched by a corresponding "particular"-concrete,
variable, ineffable.' Thus:
UNIVERSALS
Formalism
(order of ideas)
(logical analysis)
Determinism
(order of events)
(causal explanation)

PARTICULARS

Intuitionism
(subjectivism)

Viewed as the only acceptable objects of thought and language, universals are reified.2 2 Paradoxically, while "everyone
talks and acts as if [universals] were the only real things in
the world,"''1

3

particulars slip from view.' 24 Universals of

thought lose touch with particulars of human experience, reprison-house of paradox whose rooms did not connect and whose passageways ld
nowhere." Id.
' Id. at 106, 118.
" Id. at 104-06, 137-42.
" Id. at 137.
121 Id.
at 133-38.. Unger's Figure 1, id. at 138, sets out structural features and
debilitating consequences common to these antinomies.
In Id. at 136.
"2 Id.
12

Id. Thus:

The evisceration of particulars consists in treating particulars as fungible
examples of some abstract quality. To be sure, the particulars as parts are
recognized as more concrete and therefore more real than the universals as
wholes . . . .Nevertheless, as the concreteness of the particulars increases,
so does their individuality. Therefore, it becomes impossible to think or to
speak about them in general categories, hence, given the nature of thought
and language, impossible to think or speak of them at all. That much is
implied by the antinomy of theory and fact.
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sulting in an "unbridgeable gulf." In Unger's chilling metaphor, "The ghosts sing and dance on the stage while the real
25
persons sit dumbly in the pit below.'
Unger divides the realm of universals into two main orders.
One is the "order of ideas" for which the method of reasoning
is logical analysis;' 21the other is the "order of events" for which
the methdd is causal explanation."' This suggests the following
arrangement of the three modalities of explanation considered
in Part One:
In modern conceptions of:

Universals

Particulars

Science

Theory

Fact

Man

Reason

Desire

The Legal Order

Rule

Value

The tradition that defines and isolates these three categories of self-conception is the "prison house" of Western
thought. "Formalism" and "determinism" express the two orders of systematic thought and language, while "intuitionism"
denotes the inchoate world of subjective experience. With respect to judicial reasoning, formalism and determinism reify
the universals of rule and causal force, isolating them from the
experienced ("intuited") realities of deliberation and choice.
The experienced realties are similarly isolated from unifying
rule.
Unger's mode of escape is to add to the "order of ideas"
and the "order of events" a third order-an order which transcends the antinomy of universals and particulars. This is the
"order of mind, 1' 28 for which the method isneither logic nor
causality, but rather "symbolic interpretation."'' The "order
of mind" posits unity between thinker and thought, between
the particularity of individual thought-events and the generality of symbols forming the content of thought. In a similar
manner, the "order of mind" overcomes the Cartesian anti'12Id.

at 137.

,'A
Id. at 107.
127

Id.

123
Id. at 107-11.

121 Id. Unger conceives the order of mind as existing "between" the other two
orders. Id.
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nomy of reason and desire by merging objective description and
subjective valuation in "holistic consciousness."' 3
The following may be given in illustration of this order of
mind-a conception, Unger acknowledges, of which we now can
have "only the faintest awareness."''
In morals, Cartesian thought posits, on the one hand, a
universal ethics couched in terms of principles of general application and, on the other hand, an "ethic of sympathy," a response to the concrete situation. 3 ' Seeking roots in human experience for the "order of mind," Unger suggests that the use
of parable is an instance of human thought that unites these
two aspects of moral reasoning.' 3 This "image," thus uniting
universal principles and particular circumstances, may be
drawn upon to understand the "order of mind."' 34
Unger's aim is to develop a more adequate theory of society and his explorations of the order of mind are therefore
directed to the field of political theory."' This article's concern,
addressed not to political theory but to the theory of judicial
reasoning, calls for different explorations. But the starting
point is the same as Unger's. That point is a recognition of the
need to reconstruct basic categories of self-conception. 3 ' Fur13

Id. at 103, 124.

"' Id. at 143. See also id. at 117.

Id. at 141.
Id. at 143-44.
1"Id. at 144. Two other instances cited by Unger are the combination of universal
meaning and concrete particularity manifest in a great work of art, and the conception
of Christ as an embodiment of infinite, universal God and finite, particular man. Id.
"I This investigation leads Unger to a conception he calls "organic community."
Id. at 236-77. This is a community dedicated to realization of humanness through a
process conjoining experience and symbol whereby "[e]ach person and each form of
social life represents a novel interpretation of humanity." Id. at 195.
M'The difficulty and unfamiliarity of such an enterprise of reconstruction, see E.
SCHUMACHE, SMALL is BEAurrL. 74 (1973), is due in part to the immense investment
society has in the established perceptual categories. See generally Fromm,
Psychoanalysis and Zen Buddhism, in ZEN BUDHISM AND PsYcHoANALysis 97-104 (E.
Fromm ed. 1970).
Arguing there is a need, amounting to a crisis, to restore wholeness to human
rationality by bridging the gulf between reason and value choice, Larry Tribe contends
that this is the fourth in a series of crises involving major readjustment of Western
man's self-conception. See note 192 infra. But, in each of the previous three crises
Tribe posits (arising from the discoveries of Copernicus, Darwin and Freud), reconstruction was aided immeasurably by the fact that new conceptions were based on
incontrovertible empirical data. Since no similarly compelling new "data" underlie
this fourth crisis, this task of reconstruction requires an even greater leap of intellectual
13

"

KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66

ther, it is a belief that the antinomies of modern judicial
thought can be transcended by tying theory to an "order of
mind." Finally, it is a belief that, although faintly visible now,
this is a path that can lead the theory of judicial reasoning into
a larger world of self-understanding.
II.

A

DECISIONISTIC PERSPECTIVE

The antimony between universals and particulars has
thwarted development of theories responsive to the experience
of the deciding judge. By making this experience the primary
datum of theory-through a "decisionistic" perspective' 3 -the
basis for a new approach is laid. While this entire section considers the consequences of this new approach, three consequences warrant mention at the outset.
The first consequence is that the basis of theory no longer
is a system of pre-existing principles; rather, it is the problem
situation of the deciding judge. A decision situation becomes a
problem situation when it presents two or more arguably correct outcomes, any one of which the judge could choose.' 3s To
imagination than did the previous three crises. Moreover, Roberto Unger seems correct
in arguing that science-based revisions of self-conception-such as that effected by the
work of Freud-did not alter the "deep structure" of thought intrinsic to the antinomy
of universals and particulars and the orders of logic and causality discussed supra.
KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS, supra note 1, at 40-41, 118.
"I As developed in the text and notes that follow, the term "decisionistic perspective" means an approach to the theory of judicial reasoning that focuses on the problem
of decision. This perspective is allied to Jerome Hall's "law-as-action," a concept
embodying Hall's proposal that the actions of officials be made the primary datum of
jurisprudence and that those actions be understood as integration of rule, fact, and
value. See note 141 infra. As is true of Hall's "law-as-action," the synthesizing influence of the decisionistic perspective is one of its principal strengths.
It will be noted that the term "decisionistic perspective" is used instead of
"decisionism" notwithstanding that the latter term would be simpler and would match
in form the primary comparable terms-i.e., "formalism," "determinism," and
"intuitionism." There are two reasons for this choice of words. First, the suffix "ism"
connotes a fixed, self-sufficient creed or doctrine of explanation quite different from
the nascent program of eclectic exploration I describe. Second, while "decisionism"
has an inapposite established meaning, WFTSm's TMRU NEW INTERNATIONAL
DicIONARY 585 (1971) (defining "decisionism" as the [positivist] philosophy that
"right is what the legislature has determined it to be"), "decisionistic" does not;
indeed, the latter term has been used in a sense quite close to the one intended here.
See, e.g., Radbruch, Anglo-American JurisprudenceThrough Continental Eyes, 52
L.Q.R. 530, 543-44 (1936), quoted in J. STONE, HumA LAW AND HuMAN JuSTIcE 234
(1965).
'1 See note 165 infra for discussion of the term "outcome."
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be responsive to the problem of decision, theories of legal reasoning must be congruent with this reality of choice.1 3 To be
sure, in the orders of logic and causality a theory of choice-of
"discretion"-is impossible; like "lawful lawlessness," the concept is self-contradictory.1 0 However, the correct response is
not that a "theory of discretion" is absurd but that theorists
are captive in a prison house of thought that makes the idea
seem absurd.
A second consequence of the decisionistic perspective is
emphasis on decision-events, rather than on rule systems, as
the seat of coherence in the law. The perspective assigns central significance to the fact that the great dichotomies of legal
principle-order and liberty, freedom and equality-are resolved daily.' Absent this recognition, theorists are transfixed
There are two kinds of uncertainty in the law. One is curable uncertainty, as when
I am uncertain of the time and then consult a clock. Judicial uncertainty curable by
legal research is of this order.
The kind of uncertainty that gives rise to a "problem situation," in the sense
intended in the text, arises when there are viable arguments on both sides of an issue
and uncertainty is therefore incurable. See note 20 supra concerning the legal realists'
recognition of the frequency with which this kind of uncertainty occurs.
I" See Reynolds, The Concept of Objectivity in JudicialReasoning, 14 W. ONT.
L. Rav. 1, 9 (1975) (arguing that we should not "deny the reality" of judicial discretion,
but seek a successful "theory of discretion"). As suggested in the text immediately
infra, however, we must recognize the extent to which the idea of a "theory of discretion" contradicts basic precepts of modern thought.
"I This contradiction is the reason that formalism is defended by strategies that
minimize, deny, and isolate the discretion inherent in value-based choice.
"I Jerome Hall has shown the importance of this concept in his theory of "lawas-action"-a theory that makes the purposive, reasoned actions of officials the primary data in one's study of legal institutions. J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE
20, 145-46 (1973). Hall observes that much "current disagreement in moral and legal
philosophy is due to the formulation of problems in terms of high abstraction, so that
it is impossible to make a rational choice between, say, freedom and equality ....
[W]hen specific facts and issues are confronted, a rational choice between them is
regularly made." Id. at 75. Hall's view of judicial decision is part of an "integrative
jurisprudence" based on the insight that "man is distinctive as the integration of
thought and fact" and as the "rational-valuing-physical animal." Hall, The Perspective of Integrative Jurisprudence, in SYNTHmc JURISPRUDENCE 30, 35 (M. Sethna ed.

1962). For Hall, accordingly, the significant thing is that the "actions which express
legal ideas and purposes" are a "distinctive coalescence" of "legal ideas, facts, and
valuations." Id. at 37. See also J. HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 155 n.35 (1973).
Hall's "law-as-action" suggests Unger's vision of a "realm of mind" in which
principles of lawfulness and coherence are a function of the integration of universals
and particulars in human action. See notes 128-34 and accompanying text supra. See
also Cossio, Phenomenology of the Decision, in 3 LANr-AMEmcAN LEGAL PmLosoPHY

343 (1948). Viewing judicial decision "from within as living," id. at 349, Cossio seeks
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by the antinomies of abstraction, attaching no philosophic
import to the reconciliations of decision. " 2
Finally, the decisionistic perspective helps dispel a confusion pandemic in current use of the term "judicial reasoning."
It is understobd that "judicial reasoning" refers both to product
(a judicial opinion) and to process (opinion formulation). Purporting to deal with both process and product, contemporary
theories of judicial reasoning in fact give little attention to
process and, more significantly, to the very idea of differentiating it from product. 4 ' To use Unger's metaphor,144 the "ghosts"
that sing and dance upon the stage of judicial thought are the
conceptions that can render deliberation "an experience of liberty, in which the creation of something original appears every instant," id. at 348, and an interweaving of
rule, fact and value. Id. at 377.
"I4Duncan Kennedy argues that the rule component and value component of
judicial decision are not only inherently antinomous but are also representative of
"irreconcilable visions" of what the social order should be. Kennedy, supra note 9, at
1685, 1712, passim. The order of rules reflects the individualism of the Western tradition. Id. at 1685, 1713, 1767-70. See also note 114 supra. The order of valuesmanifested in "the use of equitable standards producing ad hoc decisions with
relatively little precedential value," Kennedy, supra note 59, at 1685, 1688-reflects
an ideal of altruism, id. at 1685, 1717, 1771-73, and organicism. Id. at 1767. In arguing
this antinomy, Kennedy denies that the individualist and altruist (that is, the rule and
value) ideals can be accommodated "except in the tautologicalsense that we can, as
a matter of fact, decide if we have to." Id. at 1775 (emphasis added). The word
"tautological" signifies a theoretic framework that shuts out the decisionistic perspective.
13 One of the best general accounts of the process of judicial deliberation remains
Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924). Dewey points out that
our theories perceive reasoning chiefly as product. They perceive reasoning in terms
of "the relations of consistent implication which subsist between the propositions in
which [our] finally approved conclusions are set forth." Id. at 18. The result is a
failure to see that reason in exposition is different from reason in "search and inquiry."
Id. at 24.
If, with Karl Llewellyn, one says that our ideas of process and of product in judicial
reasoning mix in a "Huck Finn stew," LLEWELYN, TaE COMMON LAW TAmrrON 289,
(1960) ideas of process contribute no more than thin soup.
To be sure, the process of deliberation has been extensively explored in terms of
decision theory and policy science, for example, in the highly developed "law, science,
and policy" system of Lasswell-McDougal. See, e.g., Moore, Prolegomenon to the
Jurisprudence of Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell, 54 VA. L. Rxv. 662 (1968).
Such approaches, however, have not made their focus the integration of rule-following
and policy in decision. One commentator has suggested that the answer is to make
rule-ordered (analytical) jurisprudence and purpose-ordered (sociological) jurisprudence "complementary and interacting halves of a legal systems theory." Conant,
Systems Analysis in the Appellate Decision-MakingProcess, 24 RuTGrS L. Rxv. 293
(1970).
" See text accompanying note 126 suprafor Unger's statement of the metaphor.
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universals of rule and principle applicable to reasoning as product, while the experienced particulars of the process of decision
are relegated, silent, to the pit.
Focusing on this duality of process and product, the decisionistic perspective attempts two things. First, it seeks to
strengthen understanding of judicial reasoning as process. Second, it seeks to integrate product and process by portraying
each as a function of the other. This second quest-a theoretic
integration of process and product-comprises the ultimate

goal of the decisionistic perspective.
A.

A Decisionistic Perspective: Themes for Exploration

If any single paradigm dominates thought about the process of judicial reasoning it is the following three-step model of
reasoning from precedent set out by E. H. Levi in Introduction
to Legal Reasoning. 5 Step one: The judge sees similarity between the case at bar and a precedent. Step two: The judge
ascertains the relevant rule of law in the precedent. Step three:
The judge applies the rule of law to the facts of the case at
bar."' This pattern reflects the conventional perception that
rational decision process:
"

E. LEvi, supra note 82.

"' Id. at 2.

Essentially the same formulation appears in H. BERM AN & W. GRENER, THE NATuRE AND FUNCTIONS OF LAW 415-19 (3d ed. 1972); R. CRoss, PRECEDEM INENGLISH LAW
182 (2d ed. 1968). While presented in terms only of reasoning from precedent, the
model is similar to the three steps proposed by Roscoe Pound for judicial reasoning
generally: (a) selection of the material on which decision is to be grounded; (b) development and interpretation of that material; and (c) application to the facts of the case.
Pound, The Theory of JudicialDecision, 36 HARv. L. REv. 940, 945 (1923).
While Levi refers to the entire process as reasoning by "example" or "analogy,"
E. LEvi, supra note 82, at 5-6 (see also H. BERMAN & W. GRmNER, supra, at 416
("analogical reasoning"); R. CROSS, supra, at 181 ("reasoning by analogy")), in fact
that the three steps correspond to three different processes of reasoning-only one of
which is reasoning by analogy. The three kinds of reasoning in Levi's three-step
paradigm are (reversing their order) deduction, induction, and analogy. Deduction is
syllogistic reasoning in which ascertained principles are the major premise, the facts
of the case are the minor premise, and the result (legal characterization of the facts)
is conclusion. Induction is the process of "abstracting" a rule from one (or more) cases.
Analogy has been described as a "short circuit" in the process of induction and deduction, whereby a precedent is argued (concluded) similar to the case at hand without
an intervening process of abstracting or applying principle. Guest, Logic in the Law,
in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JUISPRUDENCE 176, 190-91 (A. Guest ed. 1961). Guest suggests
that in fact the rule often emerges by a process of induction, the constituents of which
are the assumedly analogous precedent and the problem case itself. Id. at 191.
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(a) is sequential in that it occurs one step at a time;
(b) is cumulative in that each step determines those that

follow;
(c) is posterior to value choice in that demonstrably valid
reasoning occurs after value choice (implicit in the initial
judgment of "similarity") '" is made; and
(d) is consciously directed.

These assumptions are not "wrong," but they do reflect
the limitations of Cartesian self-conception. This section presents four "themes for exploration" in the decisionistic perspective: (1) "conjunction-concurrence"; (2) "telos of form"; (3)
"pervasive value valence"; and (4) "subverbal rationality."
These themes are, respectively, complementary opposites to
each of the preceding four assumptions of Cartesian thought.
1.

Conjunction-Concurrence

Cartesian thought identifies rationality with logic, and
logic with deduction. "' The result of this identification, according to Stephen Toulmin, is that theories of rationality fail to
reflect the realities of human reason. "9 Toulmin contrasts de-

ductive reasoning with inductive or, as Toulmin calls it,

"substantial" reasoning,'5 ' and contends that most human reasoning is of the latter kind.
Deduction, in which reasons relate as links of a chain, is
linear."' Induction is conjunctive; reasons relate as the legs of
"I For Levi, the perception of similarity between precedent and problem case is
the crucial act ("the key step in the legal process") manifesting injection of the ideals
and needs of society into the decision process. E. Lxv, supra note 82, at 2, 3-8. This
perception of similarity may or may not find support in a developed legal concept. Id.
at 8. Only when a similarity becomes "finally accepted" by society, is it given form as
a legal concept. Id. See also notes 83-84 and accompanying text supra.
Once similarity is perceived, value-free reasoning may then proceed in accordance
with Levi's final two steps. Exemplifying the "strategy of isolating value choice,"
Levi's model in this aspect is similar to Arthur Miller's view that the key step in
judicial reasoning is choice of the "premises" from which decision logically follows.
Miller, On the Choice of Major Premisesin Supreme Court Opinions,in THE SURFM
COURT AND PUBUC POUCY 118, 126 (M.Shapiro ed. 1969).
"' See TREATISE, supra note 112, at 1-4.
HI S. TouumN, TaI UsEs OF ARGUMENT 9 (1958).
"- Id. at 124-25. Toulmin prefers to avoid the terms "deductive" and "inductive"
because they come freighted with Cartesian notions about reasoning. Id.
15,
See id.
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a chair. 52 Induction may seem a familiar, widely accepted form
of judicial reasoning. It occurs, for example, whenever the
judge "draws a rule" from a group of precedents. The precedents are a conjunction of "reasons" for the rule. 53' But, as Toulmin shows generally to be the case, because induction does not
conform to Cartesian preconceptions, it is pushed to the fringes
of perception and receives little theoretic development. 54' In
judicial decision, moreover, the model of deduction is made
even more compelling by the wish to present judicial decision
as the application of pre-existing rule. Accordingly, it is no
surprise that judicial reasoning struggles to meet the standards
'
of deductive logic. 55
Toulmin postulates that the model of inductive reasoning
is rejected because the Cartesian conception of rationality does
not accommodate a leap from a conjunction of reasons to a
conclusion, and views it as irrational. 5 ' Toulmin states that
this leap must be accepted as a feature of human rationality. 5 '
There must be an effort to construct new theories of rationality
, See id. This metaphor is used to characterize legal reasoning in John Wisdom's
classic essay, Gods, in EssAYs ON LoGic AND LANGUAGE 187, 195 (A. Flew ed. 1951)
(counsel cites "those features of the case which severally co-operate . . . in favour of
calling the situation by the name by which he chooses to call it").
I" See note 146 supra for discussion of the various processes of reasoning. If, in
Levi's model, a rule is drawn by induction from but one precedent, see text following
note 145 supra, the several "reasons" that support the rule are facts or reasoning
elements within the precedent itself.
"' Called the" 'scandal of philosophy,' "P. FREUND,ON LAw AND JusTicE 67 (1968)
(citation omitted), induction has been viewed acceptable where reasoning is subject
to empirical verification, but of uncertain validity in legal reasoning. See, e.g., G.
GorrmsE, supra note 30, at 20; 0. JENsEN, THE NATURE OF LEGAL ARGUMENT 28-31
(1957); Dickinson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. PA.
L. REv. 833, 858 (1931). Julius Stone tells of the long, unsuccessful effort of John Austin
to bring induction into his systematic theory of judicial reasoning. J. STONE, supra note
6, at 314-15.
Aristotle posited a realm of nonapodictic, persuasive reasoning akin to Toulmin's
"substantive reasoning." See L. COOPER,THE RuEToMuC OF AiusToTLE (1932). However,
the validity of such "rhetorical" reasoning was undermined by Plato's demolition of
its principal proponents, the Sophists, see note 194 infra, and by the Cartesian revolution. See generally Florescu, Rhetoric and Its Rehabilitation in Contemporary
Philosophy, 3 PHiL. & RHEr. 193 (1970).
"I The persistence of this effort, and the way it distorts or conceals the problems
encountered in judicial decision, is well demonstrated in Julius Stone's analysis of the
Categories of Illusory Reference in the Growth of the Common Law. J. STONE, supra
note 6, at 235-300.
15, S. TouuU,
supra note 149, at 231.
, Id. at 250-51.
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based on the way people actually reason. ' Such an effort underlies "the new rhetoric," an important new school of study
whose aim is to build theories on careful examination of reasonings drawn from many fields. 59' For the new rhetoric, as for
Toulmin, a cardinal point is that most human reasoning is not

deductive.

'

These insights signify recognition of the conjunctive character"' of reasoning product; they lead also to a more adequate
conception of process. Cartesianism not only overstresses a linear, deductive model of product, but also erroneously assumes
that the same model is to be applied, woodenly, to process.1 2
Conjunction, by contrast, leads to a process-oriented conception called here "concurrence"-meaning that the individual
reasons which comprise the final product are held to emerge
not one at a time, but through simultaneous, correlative development."' A unified theory of product and process can thus be

expressed in a conjunction-concurrence model. The model posits that judicial opinions (product) conjoin propositions of
many different kinds. These propositions may include:
(a) rules or policies derived from statute;
(b) rules or policies derived from an aggregate of precedent;
(c) rules or policies derived from the language or holding of
an individual precedent;
Id. at 240, 248, 257-58.
The seminal work is TREATISE, supra note 112. With respect to the program of
the new rhetoric, see id. at 9-10.
The bulk of TREATISE is devoted to systematic description of reasoning drawn from
literature, politics, and the law. The authors treat "techniques of argumentation"
under five headings: (a) "Quasi-Logical Arguments"; (b) "Arguments Based on the
Structure of Reality"; (c) "The Relations Establishing the Structure of Reality"; (d)
"The Dissociation of Concepts"; and (e)"The Interaction of Arguments." Id. at viiiX.
160See TREATISE, supra note 112, at 1-4. A major limitation of the new rhetoric is
that it addresses reasoning chiefly as a tool of persuasion, rather than as deliberation.
See generallytext following note 142 supra for discussion of the importance of treating
reason in terms that join the process of deliberation with its product.
I Itmust be stressed that deduction and induction both occur in judicial reasoning. It has been suggested that judicial reasoning is best understood as inductive
reasoning in which there are "ancillary deductive steps." J. STONE, supra note 6, at
331-32.
"I See note 143 and accompanying text supra for discussion of the failure to
differentiate process from product.
'1 Cf. Dewey, supra note 143, at 23-24 (positing that the propositions of the final
reasoning product emerge "tentatively and correlatively" in deliberation).
"'

"
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considerations of justice or social utility applicable to

the parties at bar;
(e) considerations of justice or social utility applicable to
persons to be affected by future applications of the decision. "'

The judge starts with a tentative conclusion (hypothesis)
comprised of a result"5 plus one or more supporting propositions. The hypothesis may be, for example, that a given statutory rule, common law rule, or individual precedent dictates a
certain result, and that the result is supported by considerations of policy corresponding to proposition types (d) or (e). On
the other hand, the initial hypothesis may reflect uncertainty
concerning proposition types (a), (b), and (c), and be dominated by a proposition of type (d) or (e).
Whatever the starting point, deliberation centers on a
changing, developing pattern of propositions. The more domipattern becomes, the more it determines to which
nant a given
"realm"1" ' of proposition type the judge's deliberation is directed, and the more it establishes a criterion of "fit" that
influences the judge's resolution of ambiguity or conflict encountered in each realm. Difficulty in deliberation is characterized by (i) conflict among the realms; (ii) rejection and reforpatterns; and (iii) contention among almation of hypothesis
16 7
patterns.
ternative
1,4Considerations of policy, justice, social utility, etc., are a legitimate basis for
decision only when made relevant by a statute, precedent, or other authority. In
proposition types (a), (b), and (c), the term "policies" means value or purpose tied
closely to, and an element in the interpretation of, authority. On the other hand, policy
often is tied to authority by nothing more than an assumption that the court or
legislature intended to do justice and serve the ends of social utility. Proposition types
(d) and (e) posit the functional independence in deliberation of "policy" loosely attached to a case or statute.
"I It should be kept in mind that the problem element-the disputed outcome-in
a case often is not which side should win, but the rationale and rule that will emerge
from the court's reasoning.
NI Cf. note 190 and accompanying text infra for the "new rhetoric" notion of
topos-the place or resource from which arguments are derived.
I" The conjunction-concurrence model can be illustrated in terms of a line of cases
interpreting the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2421 (1970) (prohibiting transportation in
commerce of any woman "for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any
other immoral purpose") discussed in E. LEvy, supra note 82, at 33-57. Drawn at
random from the reasoning in those cases, examples can be given of each of the five
proposition types posited above:
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Assuming the sequential (step-by-step) character of deliberation, the legal realists asserted that in fact judges often
begin with 68their "conclusion" and reason backwards to their
"premise."' Reasoning by means of a syllogism turned backwards is by definition illegitimate.
For the realists, "conclusion" signified the impact upon
the litigants of a particular resolution; 6 ' "premise" signified
the principles of law which justify that resolution. The
conjunction- concurrence model suggests, however, that
"conclusion" and "premise"-as thus conceived-define but
two among a number of "realms" of proposition, the development of which proceeds correlatively, not sequentially, in deliberation.
The argument for such a conjunction-concurrence model
rests in part on the way this conception supports and is supported by other themes of decisionistic exploration.
(a) Rule: definition of "debauchery" based on common understanding of that
term; Policy: the purpose of the Mann Act to stamp out "white slave traffic."
(b) Rule: precedential consensus extending the Act to instances of prostitution
and concubinage lacking characteristics (e.g., involuntariness) of white slavery; Policy:
precedentail consensus that the Act's purposes extend beyond prohibition of the
white slave traffic.
(c) Rule and policy propositions like those in (b), but couched in terms of the
result or reasoning of a particular precedent.
(d) The perceived degree of fit between the gravity of a felony conviction, on the
one hand, and the character of the defendant and of the acts of immorality at bar, on
the other.
(e) The consequences of the Act's broad reach, including the character of the
defendants and of the actions it would punish.
The conjunction-concurrence model suggests that the judge begins with a
"hypothesis" dominated by several propositions of this type. Thereafter, the judge's
attention, in deliberation and research, plays over the realms-perceptions and conclusions in others (for example, perception of social consequences in realm (e) may influence interpretation of precedents in realm (b))-as the judge works toward a selfconsistent, conjunctive pattern of reasons. Contention among alternative patterns arises when opposing propositions, and hence conflicting paths to reconciliation among
the realms, are seen. For two such opposing patterns of Mann Act reasoning product,
see the majority and dissenting opinions in Mortenson v. United States, 322 U.S. 1037
(1944) (employee prostitutes taken on vacation trip by their employer, engaging in no
illicit sexual conduct during the trip; held: Mann Act inapplicable) (5-4 decision).
"' See Miller, The Myth of Objectivity in Legal Research and Writing, 18 CATH.
U. L. REV. 290, 293 (1969).
"' See note 75 and accompanying text supra for the doctrine of "particular justice."
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2.

Telos of Form

Tied closely to the model of sequentiality in reasoning is
the idea that each step in the chain of reasoning determines
those that follow-as in mechanical causation. The
conjunction-concurrence model, however, suggests that goaldeterminedness may be an equally important concept-deliberation being determined by the goal of reconciling
evidently inconsistent propositions.
The most useful application of the concept of goaldeterminedness may be in relation to the goal of constructing
a conjunctive pattern of reasons conforming to one from among
a number of normative patterns. The more clearly a stock of
such patterns is formulated, the more a coherent telos of form
could guide deliberation. Developing this stock, then, is a second theme for efforts to unify process and product in judicial
reasoning.
In what terms might such patterns of reasoning product be
formulated? They might be generated from recurring patterns
observed in judicial reasoning," 0 from noteworthy instances of
judicial reasoning,' and from more generalized principles of
119
See, e.g., the patterns posited in M. RomBAuER, LEGAL PROBLEM SOLVING 27
(1973). In illustration, two of these patterns are that the judge:
States a principle
Explains underlying reasoning
Finds no decisions refusing to apply principle
Discusses decisions which applied principle-very similar facts
Applies principle
States generally accepted rule
Discusses criticism of rule by secondary authorities
Considers impact of rule in business community
Considers contrary alternative rule
Rejects generally accepted rule
Adopts alternative rule
It must be emphasized that failure to distinguish between process and product in
judicial reasoning, see note 143 and accompanying text supra, has led to failure to
differentiate models of process from models of product. Thus, for example, the conventional assumption would be that a product pattern of the kind contemplated here is
also a process pattern in the sense that it defines steps through which the judge would
proceed in deliberation. However, the conjunction-concurrence model, reflecting the
non-linear character of reasoning process, challenges such simple identification of
process with linear product.
VI See, e.g., the majority opinion in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974),
in which the analysis progresses through constitutional rule, constitutional value, and
then competing interests.
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reason formulation.'7 2 A stock of normative patterns could not
dictate the correct form for a given decision. "Correct" and
"dictate" in this context are part of the baggage of Cartesian
rationality. 7'3 Rather, "guidance" is the operative concept
here. 74' With respect to product, the paradigms would provide
one standard for judging the quality of judicial opinions; in
terms of process, they would provide a goal of form to guide
deliberation.
3.

Pervasive Value Valence

In the conjunction-concurrence model, rule and value
propositions coalesce in the process of judicial reasoning. In
some measure, then, the model helps overcome the value problem by showing the connectedness of rule and value.7 5 But to
confront the value problem fully requires value to be seen not
merely as "proposition" but also as force-as a set of "can't
helps" ' which give rise to undeliberated value choice.
Cartesianism suggests a paradigm 77' in which value determinations precede rational deliberation. But, because this
model isolates value choice,' 78 it encounters all the problems of
reason-value antinomy. 7 9 Furthermore, it is incompatible with
concurrence in reason formulation.
How can one accept value preference in judicial reasoning
without resort to a strategy of isolating value choice? I suggest a model whereby every proposition that enters the deliberating judge's perceptual field is understood to have a value
172 See, e.g., Perry, Moral and Judicial Reasoning: A Structural Analogy, 22
BuFFALo L. REV. 769 (1973). Seeking a "mode of rationality which is available even
when uniquely correct arguments and results are not," id. at 795, Thomas Perry suggests a certerisparibusmodel of rules (in the form "this rule controls, all things being
equal") in which reasoning is centered on the conditions argued to make the rule
inapplicable. Id. at 781.

"I See note 185 infra in which the need to overcome Cartesian precepts is discussed.
, See note 185 infra for non-Cartesian conceptions of deliberation.
175

Cf. note 185 and accompanying text infra where this connectedness is dis-

cussed.
,7 Holmes, NaturalLaw, 32 HARv.L. Rv. 40,40-41 (1918). But see note 185 infra.
See note 147 and accompanying text supra for appreciation of the paradigm.
,78See, e.g., text accompanying notes 35-39, 62-67 supra for discussion of
"7

"isolating value choice."
7I See, e.g., notes 40-41 and accompanying text supra for reference to these problems.
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valence. ' Whether the object of perception be a rule proposition or a value proposition, perception and valuation conjoin in
one action as the judge's valuations give each proposition a
"valence"-positive, negative, or neutral-that influences
commensurately the weight accorded the proposition in perception and deliberation. The more an issue is in doubt, the
more the choice between competing propositions will be influenced by their respective value valences.
This notion of value valence, like others presented here,
can help one understand the realities of deliberative experience. Chiefly, it embodies recognition that value choice is not
an isolated step or stage in deliberation-as it is portrayed by
theories that implement the "strategy of isolating value
choice."'"' On the other hand, the idea of value valence is not
a license for judicial subjectivism.' 2 In the Cartesian system,
true choice is impossible. Rules dictate results by logic while
value dictates results by deterministic force; the rationally
deliberating "I" is lost.' 3 But in the experienced realities of
the "order of mind" ' there is a controlled freedom that
throughout the process of deliberation fuses value choice to
rule.'85 "Pervasive value valence" is offered as one conception
I"Cf. Cohen, Field Theory and JudicialLogic, 59 YAI L.J. 238, 248-51 (1950)
(proposing a model whereby a value force field created by the judge determines the
perceived "shape of precedent as well as its size").
"I See text accompanying notes 35-39, 62-67 supra for discussion of the assumption that value choice comprises a distinct step or phase in judicial reasoning.
LI Cf. note 195 and accompanying text infra ("collective deliberation" reduces the
subjectivity of individual deliberation).
i See note 185 infra regarding non-Cartesian precepts of rational choice.
m See text accompanying notes 128-34 supra for a discussion of the "order of
mind."
LU The proponents of "the new rhetoric," see note 159 and accompanying text
supra, have shown that only by overcoming Cartesian precepts will we be able to
conceive reasoning in terms such that "a reasonable choice can be exercised"; only
then can theories embrace "human community in the sphere of action." TREATISE,
supra note 112, at 514. Cf. Recasens-Siches, The Logic of the Reasonable as Differentiated from the Logic of the Rational (HumanReason in the Making and the Interpretation of the Law), in EssAYs IN JURISPRUDENCE iN HONOR OF Roscoa POUND 192, 209
(R. Newman ed. 1962) (arguing the need for theories of reasoning that give significance
to choice).
The model of pervasive value valence suggests an order of mind in which the
deliberator is conceived as neither process-controlling nor process-controlled, but as
process-entering. Compare the concept of "middle voice," familiar in some grammars
but rare in English, which refers to action without differentiating whether the actor is
subject or object. See DICTIONARY OF LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTIcs 251-52 (R. Hartmann
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by which to unify valuation and the application of rules.
4.

Subverbal Rationality

What results if, breaking with Cartesian precepts, rational
process is viewed as in part consciously directed and in pqrt
subverbal1 s What follows, in short, if conscious rationality is
rooted in "subverbal rationality"?
One result is to magnify the importance of conceptions of
reasoning that are congruent with such a view. An example is
the "new rhetoric"187 precept of topoi,158 reflecting the idea,
echoed in the "situationism" of Christian ethics,8 9 that the
premises of reasoning can be understood not only as propositions but as a resource, or place, from which reasons emerge. 1 '
& F. Stork eds. 1972) ("Voice"). Cf. J. LATHm, Tm GESTALT THERAPY BOOK 25-26
(1973) (suggesting the importance of this nondeterministic concept in gestalt psychology).
.I It is true that the intuitionism of the legal realists, see text accompanying notes
68-85 supra, posits a "subverbal" basis for decision. But it also is the case that
"intuitionism" signifies the abandonment of theoretic explanation, see text accompanying note 79 supra, and figure following note 127 supra. The program contemplated
by this article is theoretic development of the subverbal and its integration into theories of judicial reasoning.
Arthur Koestler has characterized identification of rational mind with conscious
thinking as a legacy of the "Cartesian Catastrophe." A. KOESTLER, THE ACT OF CREATION: A STUDY OF THE CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS IN SCIENCE AND ART 148 (1964).
01 See note 159 and accompanying text supra for discussion of the new rhetoric.
I For a discussion of topoi, see note 190 infra.
's, Conceptions of principle referred to in the text immediately infra and in the
following note are paralleled in J. FLETCHER, SITUATION ETmcs: THE NEw MoRnsTY
(1966). Fletcher's book, moreover, facilitates contrast between the conception of principle here posited and that manifest in the strategy of isolating value choice, as typified
by Richard Wasserstrom. See text accompanying notes 35-39 supra.
Like Wasserstrom, Fletcher posits the existence of two polar modes of reasoning.
Also as in Wasserstrom's analysis, one mode is legalism, in which rules govern; the
other is antinomianism, in which one finds the ethical solution intuitively. J.
FLErcHE, supra, at 18, 22-23. However, unlike Wasserstrom's solution, Fletcher proposes what might be called a chemical synthesis. This synthesis is a situationist model
whereby one "enters into every decision-making situation fully armed with the ethical
maxims of his community and its heritage, and he treats them with respect as illuminators of his problems." Id. at 26. The situationist point is not merely that principle
systems have interstitial gaps to be bridged in application; nor merely that principles
need to be compromised on occasion; nor merely that principles need to be examined
periodically to assure that they still serve the needs of justice or social utility. The
point is that it is intrinsic to the very character of principles that they are less
"directors" than "illuminators," id. at 29; they are a source of guidance in decision.
I" Derived from Aristotle's rhetoric, the concept of topoi (topics) (or, in Cicero's
variant, loci (places)) renders the idea that in nonapodictic reasoning, see note 154
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The precepts of "structuralism," as recently shown,"' provide
a second means of tying product to subverbal process in judicial deliberation.
A second contribution of "subverbal rationality" is to put
the theory of judicial reasoning in touch with a host of explorations in humanistic thought' 5 -supporting a holistic conception of judge as rule-following, valuing self. In addition to positing a gulf between verbal rationality and nonverbal "will,"
supra, the foundation for argument is not a set of propositions but is a resource (locus)
from which arguments are derived. See J. STONE, supra note 6, at 330-32.
Julius Stone, suggesting that the new rhetoric may be the best new avenue toward
better understanding of judicial reasoning, id. at 335-37, observes with respect to the
notion of topoi that "the data from which judges begin to reason (the premise of their
purported logical [deductive] argument, as it were) is often not a legal proposition,
but is some sort of composite of such propositions with notions of justice or policy."
Id. at 333-34. If such a "composite stands uneasily as a premise" in deductive reasoning, "we can think of it easily and fruitfully as a 'place of argument' or 'topos' for the
more open argument and testing characteristic of rhetorics." Id. at 334.
Stone observes further that the notion of topoi illuminates the nature of reasoning
from precedent. Thus,
[W]hen we call a case "a leading case," what we really mean is that that
case is, for the time being, a seat of argument. What [precise propositions]
the case stands for can rarely. . .be determined by analysis of either of the
facts or the judgments. Yet some composite of these is still where argument
tends to start, once it becomes common ground that the case is a leading
case, and so long as it remains so. In that sense a leading case is a topos of
legal argument.
Id. at 334-35 (emphasis omitted).
"I See Hermann, A StructuralistApproach to Legal Reasoning, 48 S. CAL.L. REV.
1131 (1975) (stressing the "cognitive" role of the unconscious, id. at 1141, and presenting a model in which judicial decision is partly unconscious "mediation" between
binary opposites, id. at 1150-53).
12 By the phrase "put in touch," I mean that the themes of human wholeness and
of the tragedy of modem fragmentation in socially important works such as M. BUaR,
I AND THOU 7-17, 43 (1958); R. PrsIG, ZEN AND THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE:
AN INQUiRY INTO VALtuEs 284, 351, 371-72 (1974); and P. TmLcH, THE COURAGE TO BE
137-39 (1952), should not merely be remarked with interest, but incorporated into our
theories.
See also Tribe, Technology Assessment and the FourthDiscontinuity:The Limits
of Instrumental Rationality, 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 617 (1973). Tribe argues that the great
need now is to build thoughtways that can
encompass a vision of human existence in which wanting and knowing-desire and reason-present integrated facets of a common reality rather
than opposing poles of an inexorable dichotomy [and which will] embrace
an idea of rationality that is more personal and more deeply rooted in the
life history of the individual than is true of abstract, universal reason.
Id. at 654. Tribe notes that history has seen other crises requiring reconstruction of our
conceptions, id. at 617, and argues that the unfamiliarity of the needed new thoughtways must not cause us to dismiss the quest as empty or absurd. See id. at 654.
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Cartesianism assumes that rationality is a function of
autonomous mind. 9 3 Subverbal rationality, by contrast, suggests conceptions of deliberation that show the deliberator dependent and incomplete' 4-thereby increasing the theoretic
import of collegiality in judicial deliberation, 9'5 as of judicial
"I The doctrine of autonomous mind is a principal feature of the legacy of Plato,
E. HAVELOCK, PREFACE TO PLATO 204 (1963), though it reaches full flower in the Cartesian conception of rationality.
"I With respect to the doctrine of autonomous mind, it may be correct to speak
of a "prison house," see notes 111-34 and accompanying text, supra, of 2000 years
duration. It is well to gain perspective on the inception of this doctrine.
In establishing the precept of autonomous mind, see note 193 supra, Plato overthrew a conception of interdependence in deliberation central to the philosophy of
sophistry. Plato not merely deposed that conception, but his writings fundamentally
distorted sophistry-reducing it to the ethos of opportunistic, fallacious argument by
which it is known today.
In order to establish his vision of a stable world knowable to reason, Plato had to
overthrow a philosophy for which human opinion was central. Sophistry defined
"reason" (logos) as "the flexible discourse of human beings," and "sought to rationalize the process by which opinion is formed and then effectively expressed." E. HAVELocK, THE LIBERAL TEMPER IN GREEK POLITICS 156 (1957). For sophistry, the "good" was
discoverable only by community process, and "political judgment. . .[was] hardly
distinguishable from communication." Id. at 193. As a philosophy, then, sophistry was
concerned with the formation of judgment; of only secondary importance was the
technology of persuasion. Id. at 220, 241. In portraying as demagogic the ethos of the
elder Sophists, see id. at 156, Plato denied the central tenet of their philosophy-an
ideal of "social and political responsibility," id. at 230, and of group deliberation
characterized by "sincerity and total involvement." Id. at 221. See generally id. at 21522.
Also important to one's perspective on the origins of our 2000-year conception of
autonomous mind is Plato's similarly successful overthrow of the poetic tradition. See
E. HAVELOCK, supra note 193. Indeed, for Plato's theory of autonomous mind, the
"arch-enemy" was "poetic experience"-the "over-all state of mind[,] let us call it
the Homeric," id. at 47, 235, inherent in openness to a narrative. Such surrender of
self was anathema to Plato. Id. at 207. Plato saw in it the "chief obstacle to scientific
rationalism, to the use of analysis, to the classification of experience to its rearrangement in sequence of cause and effect." Id. at 47. Poetic was rooted in the realm of
"acts-and-events" (pragmata), id. at 237, 244, alien to truth, beauty, and goodness-the static concepts, knowable to reason, that comprise essential reality. Plato
assigned to the realm of poetic the term "doxa"--meaning opinion or belief. Id. at 235,
248. Doxa, embracing "contradiction almost as a principle," represented for Plato the
"pluralization and the concreteness and the confusion of the poetised statement." Id.
at 246.
,, Although obeisance is paid to the virtues of collective deliberation, see, e.g., 1
WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 8a, at 246 (3d ed. 1940); Brennan, Working at Justice, in AN
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF THE SUPREME COURT

299 (A. Westin ed. 1964); it has received little

attention in the judicial reasoning literature. Note, for example, the paucity of refer-

ence to it in the excellent recent compendium, L.

ALDiSERT, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS

(1976). The overriding point is that theories of judicial reasoning, centered on the idea
of autonomous mind, assign a peripheral role to deliberative interdepend-
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"dialogue" in other forms.'96
Does subverbal rationality carry theorists too far from the
proper sphere of law academics? Can the implicated teachings
of psychology, philosophy, and religion be mastered? These are
troubling questions.'97 But one should respond with full awareness that fragmented self-conception is basic to the Cartesian
prison house ' and that wholeness of self-conception depends
on synthesis of these various views of self. Moreover, judicial
decision is the phenomenon in society which, more than any
other, challenges one to understand the combination of rule
and value. It therefore seems a suitable focus for eclectic study
of rational, valuing self.
B. Application of the DecisionisticPerspective: The Problem
of Constitutional Review
Having been presented in a set of "themes for exploration," the decisionistic perspective can now be developed more
concretely by application to a perennial problem of judicial
scholarship-the problem of defining standards of constitutional review under the equal protection clause. It generally is
understood that while purporting to apply a "two-tier" standard of review,'99 in fact the courts apply a multiplicity of stanence-reducing it chiefly to a set of aids for the autonomous deliberator. See, e.g., K.
LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITON 31 (1960). By contrast, the sophistic tradition

of thought considered in the preceding note accords great theoretic significance to
interdependence. See also Hardwig, The Achievement of Moral Rationality,6 PHIL. &
RHgr. 171 (1973). Hardwig, in an essay published as part of the literature of the new
rhetoric, argues that moral rationality "necessarily includes a public, cooperative enterprise;" "we" can be ethically rational but "you cannot and I cannot" separately.
Id. at 171. Moral rationality, Hardwig argues, is "essentially an achievement of a
multi-person encounter," id. at 179, carried on through dialogues in which the participants open themselves to growth and change. Id. at 181-83.
I. Regarding another form of dialogue, see note 97 supra.
"' See, e.g., the bibliogrephy in A. KoasTLER, supra note 186, at 717-25 for only
one part of the appalling breadth of ground potentially relevant to theories of judicial
reasoning.
"I See generally sources cited in note 192 supra for discussion of this fragmentation. Commenting on the problem of fragmentation in human knowledge, Stuart
Hampshire observed that "[k]nowledge . . .diffused among differrent minds cannot
be put together, in a single act of mind, to generate further thought; it can be and I
believe often now is, sterilized by this separation." Hampshire, The Future of
Knowledge, N.Y. Ray. BOOKS 14 (Mar. 31, 1977).
"IOne "tier" is the normal ("rational basis") standard of review that asks only
whether the governmental action at issue is rationally related to a permissible end.
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dards.200 The roots of the problem, however, run deeper.
Characteristically couched in all-or-none terms, legal rules
provide limited guidance for resolution of conflict among rules
or of continua within rules." 1 This inadequacy presents a special problem in the case of the "all-or-none" rules that express
the standards of constitutional review,12° since these standards
purport to guide the review process." 3 Thus, the key to more
adequate standards of constitutional review lies in better conin the numceptualization of the process of review rather than
2 4
1
devised.
tests
the
of
ber, or even the substance,
See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802 (1969); McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106
(1949). The second "tier" is a rigorous ("strict scrutiny") standard of review, triggered
by injury with respect to a "fundamental right" or "suspect classification," that requires the government to show a "compelling interest" in the action. See, e.g., Shapiro
v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1968); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Educ., 383 U.S. 663
(1966); Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S.
214 (1944).
21 Commonly cited examples of decisions evidencing departure from the two-tier
dichotomy are Weber v. Aetna & Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972) (illegitimacy, though not a
"suspect classification," evidently regarded as warranting somewhat higher than rational basis standard); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (though gender not a "suspect
classification," discrimination against females evidently regarded as warranting somewhat higher than rational basis standard); United States Dept. of Agriculture v.
Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973) (evidently according higher than rational basis standard
to an interest concededly not a "fundamental right"). The fact of multiple standards
has been asserted by several of the Justices themselves. E.g., Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S.
441, 457-59 (1973) (White, J., concurring); San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 9899 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting). A majority, however, continues to assert that, with
the arguable exception of sex discrimination, two-tier review is the governing standard.
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210 unnumbered note (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1976)
(per curiam); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 812-14 (1976).
2I See generally McCoy, Logic Versus Value Judgment in Legal and Ethical
Thought, 23 VAND. L. REv. 1277 (1970). See also note 20 suprasuggesting the frequency
with which rules do conflict.
The first tier of review consists of two binary (all-or-none) determinations: (i)
2
that a rational purpose is or is not discernible, and, if discernible, (ii) that the government action is or is not rationally related to achievement of that purpose. In the second
tier the comparable determinations are: (i) that a compelling purpose is or is not
discernible, and, if discernible, (ii) that the government action is or is not the least
restrictive means of achieving that purpose.
21 Under the two-tier model, the purported procedure is that one first ascertains
which tier is appropriate, and then one scrutinizes the proof and makes the all-or-none
determination called for by the indicated test.
210 Varying the all-or-none formulae may not provide the answer. See, e.g.,
Gunther, A Model for a New EqualProtection,86 HA{v. L. Rsv. 1, 20 (1972) (proposing
the single test whether "legislative means. . . substantially further legislative ends").
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A mode of conceptualizing review that escapes the trap of
all-or-none rule is that proposed by Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dandridge v. Williams. °5 Rejecting review based on a
two-tier dichotomy between "fundamental rights" 26 and other
important interests, Justice Marshall asserted that
concentration must be placed [instead] upon the character
of the classification in question, the relative importance to
individuals in the class discriminated against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the asserted
state interests in support of the classification." 7
This approach, however, is subject to the opposite objection
that it has too little structure; that it signifies the
"lawlessness" of ad hoc balancing.
The two modes considered for stating a standard of constitutional review present the dilemma seen in judicial decision
generally: the dilemma requiring choice between formalism
and ad hoc decision." 8 Suppose, as in the decisionistic perspective generally, a "middle way" is sought?
The response suggested here is to develop from the
conjunction-concurrence 9 model more adequate factor-based
conceptions of constitutional review. While the delineation of
relevant "factors" in the course of judicial reasoning is a familiar idea, a theory of "factors" adequate to provide a foundation
for standards of constitutional review is lacking. The underlying reason for this absence may be that such theory would cut
across the formalist-intuitionist polarity that, as seen, structures the prison house of Western thought.2 1 ° This section suggests three strategies for constructing a theory of factors upon
which more adequate standards of constitutional review may
be based.
As Jerome Hall noted in his exposition of "law-as397 U.S. 471, 508 (1970).
See note 199 supra for this dichotomy.
2" 397 U.S. at 520-21.
20 See generally Kennedy, supra note 59.
2" See text accompanying notes 148-69 supra where this model is presented.
211 Surveying the literature and cases that reflect the problems inherent in twotier review, see, e.g., note 200 and accompanying text supra, one is impelled to seek
explanations for the absence of alternative formulations that avoid the trap of ad hoc
balancing.
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judicial decision is a fusion of rule, fact, and value.

This suggests that the "factors" of judicial reasoning should be
deliberately fashioned so as to embody such a fusion. It would
follow that the tendency to identify factors solely with "in-

terests '21 2 is misguided, and thus Marshall's interest balanc-

ing model is justly open to the charge of "lawless ad hoc"
balancing. Instead, factors should be framed in terms that
merge rule, fact, and value-as in the "definitional balancing"
model suggested by Emerson and Nimmer in the context of
first amendment rights.1 3
Between the models of rule application and of ad hoc balancing, "definitional balancing" means that while decision is
governed by rules, the operative terms of the rules are defined
in relation to "factors" responsive to contending constitutional
values. The court can articulate its definitional factors at a
level calculated to strike an accommodation between the particularity needed for the situation at bar and the generality
needed for effective case-by-case development of rules.1
211 See

note 141 supra for discussion of this concept.
Constitutional review often is conceived as the analysis and "balancing" of
contending "interests." See, e.g., Dowling, Interstate Commerce Power and State
Power, 24 VA. L. Rlv. 1 (1940) (setting out the conceptual foundation for a balancing
of interest approach in cases involving commerce clause restrictions on state power);
P. KAUPER, Cnm LIBERIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 117 (1962) ("balance of interest
approach" termed the dominant reality in constitutional review); Gunther, supranote
204, at 1, 7 (giving primacy to effective balancing of interests in constitutional review).
212

21

See generally T.

EMERSON,

TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT

53-62 (1966); Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free Speech: The Issues Left
Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. Rnv. 311, 328-29 nn. 78, 87 (1974); Nim.mer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to
Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALw. L. Rlv. 935, 942-48 (1968).
2,4 While in ad hoc balancing the competing interests are weighed anew in each
case, "definitional balancing" identifies interest-responsive factors that define rules of
general application. In the context of free speech and the right of privacy, for example,
instead of ad hoc balancing between the speech and privacy interests implicated in
each case, rules (governing the scope of first amendment privilege) are defined in terms
of factors (e.g., whether the speaker knew the utterance was false and defamatory) in
terms of which generalized balances of interest are struck. See Nimmer, supra note
213, at 944-45, 951-52.
The approach of definitional balancing is not novel; on the contrary, it underlies
much judicial reasoning. The point, however, is that conventional perceptions of judicial reasoning have failed to accord this process the central place, and the theoretic
development, it warrants. "Definitional balancing" remains simply one school of
thought concerning first amendment rights, see Lange, The Speech and Press Clauses,
23 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 77, 88 (1975), while it ought to be a developing conceptual foundation for more adequate factor based theories of judicial reasoning.
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It also follows that judicial opinions should delineate factors that explicitly tie the major facts supporting decision to
the values and purposes made relevant by rule. This point can
be illustrated in terms of one of the classics of factor-based
reasoning, Burton v. Wilmington ParkingAuthority. 215 Finding
government involvement in private enterprise sufficient to
make private discrimination "state action" for purposes of the
fourteenth amendment, the Court centered its reasoning on an
itemization of the incidents of government involvement. In dissent, Justice Harlan accused the majority of merely "throwing
together various factual bits and pieces. ' 21- Justice Harlan's
criticism has merit in that the majority should have presented
the operative facts of government involvement in a way that
achieved greater generality, and tied them more clearly to the
purposes that underlie the mandate of the fourteenth amendment 21'-thus fusing rule, fact, and value.
A second strategy, suggested by the preceding discussion
of conjunction-concurrence, 21 is to search for generalized principles for organizing reasons that can give guidance to factorbased reasoning. 29 The third strategy involves the idea of cooperation between academics and judges. Consider, for example,
20
Gerald Gunther's assessment of the work of Justice Powell.
' 221
Finding Powell's performance "especially noteworthy,
Gunther saw marked resemblance to the craftsmanship of Justice Harlan. 222 For Gunther, balancing that manages to
"conjoin the particular with the general 223 is central to the
2,5365 U.S. 715 (1961).
2,6

Id. at 728.
end would have been served, for example, had the facts of participation

217This

been grouped, and their gravamen expressly defined, in terms of the government (a)
benefiting by the enterprise; (b) playing a major role in creation of the enterprise; and
(c)failing to use its proprietary authority to prohibit the acts of discrimination.
"ISSee text accompanying notes 148-69 for this discussion.
2,,One approach would be to examine generalized formulations of constitutional
review, see, e.g., the ceteris paribus model, supra note 169; Sharpio, Stability and
Change in JudicialDecision-Making:Incrementalismor Stare Decisis, in THE SUPREME
Couar AND PUBLic 22 (M. Sharpio ed. 1969). The insights of each of the formulations
could be drawn into one's theory of factor-based reasoning.
2 Gunther, In Search of Judicial Quality on a Changing Court: The Case of
Justice Powell, 24 STAN. L.,REv. 1001 (1972).
21 Id. at 1002.
m Id. at 1003.
m Id. at 1027 (citation and emphasis omitted). See also id. at 1004-14.
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The key to this conjoining, and a chief cri-

terion in Gunther's assessment of Powell's performance, is that
one must "draw out all the concerns in a balancing analysis-weaving those concerns into unified principles to guide
5
decision."

2

Granted, no clear conclusions emerge from Gunther's analysis. The nature of conjoining remains shadowy and Justice
Powell's execution is deemed that of a "novice" whose mastery
is far from complete. 26 But the point is this: Can one see in
Gunther's assessment of the work of Justice Powell the seeds
of fruitful partnership? The traditional scholarly imperative is
to formulate and advocate new standards of constitutional review. 2 7The decisionistic perspective, however, suggests that if
Gunther's assessment of Justice Powell could be conceived as
true dialogue between the two, it might contribute more to
development of constitutional review than all the proposed new
standards. Indeed, it could be said that the aim of the decisionistic perspective is to join theoretician and practitioner-bringing to judicial explorations the voice of theory and
228
of dialogue.

In sum, the decisionistic perspective signifies pursuit of
theory congruent with practice-a congruence essential if the
22

Id. at 1004.

225Id. at 1015.
228Id.

2 See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 204, at 1.
221The possibility of such dialogue has a significance greater than improvement
of our models of constitutional review. It has been observed that an essential task of
constitutional law scholars is to "keep the Court honest." Preface to Tm SUPREME
Couirr AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 48, at viii. Beyond the chastisements of

scholarly critique, means to this end are suggested by Charles Frankel's analysis of how
to hold accountable the complex institutions of modern government.
[T]he area or groups who conduct the examination of the [institution of]
government in question

. . .

have to know the right questions to ask, and

they also have to be able to tell a good answer from a bad one. [Also] there
must be effective communication between those who perform and those who
judge the performance. .

.

.The standards of judgment by the critics must

have some relation to the realities of the performers' tasks.
C. FRANKEL, THE DEMocRATc PROSPECT 158-59 (1962).

It has been suggested that, to square the Court with democracy, we should open
to public scrutiny methods of judicial deliberation, even making public the substance
of the deliberations themselves. Miller & Sastri, Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On
the Need for Piercingthe Red Velour Curtain, 22 BUrALO L. Rxv. 799 (1973). It would
seem, however, that disclosure of actual deliberations would be acceptable only after
we have narrowed the present gulf between theory and reality in judicial reasoning.
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theory of judicial reasoning is to fulfill the three functions
which, as earlier suggested,29 comprise "adequacy" in theory.
Thus, the congruence of theory and practice embodied in the
decisionistic perspective signifies theory that (a) is useful to
judges, as by providing theories of factors that guide process as
well as product; (b) provides norms that delimit, and so help
legitimate, the judicial function; and (c) permits the advocate
more accurate perception of, and hence more effective partnership in, judicial decision-making.
It will be noted that "theory" is used here in the generally
accepted sense of a model, or picture, of judicial reasoning.
Thus, the preceding pages have addressed the decisionistic
perspective chiefly in terms of models of judicial reasoning it
may produce.
But such a conception of "theory" is static and therefore
incomplete. Thus, it is crucial that our understanding of judicial reasoning-as our understanding of all phenomena we
study-constantly is unfolding. A "theory" is responsive to this
temporal dimension of our thought to the extent it guides the
process of inquiry. This suggests that a fourth criterion of adequacy in "theory" is its fruitfulness as a guide to inquiry. In
terms of this criterion, the significance of the decisionistic
perspective lies in its suggesting routes of exploration toward
major uncharted areas in our understanding of judicial reasoning.
III.

RECONSTRUCTION As

A HUMAN

ENTERPRISE

In what we have called its "temporal" aspect, then, theory
signifies an enterprise of inquiry. This suggests, in turn, that
in conceiving reconstruction of the theory of judicial reasoning
we should look not merely "outward" at the sought-for products of reconstruction, but also "inward" at ourselves as theory
formulators. Such an inward view suggests three points about
the enterprise of reconstruction.
First, since the orthodoxies of Platonic-Cartesian conception continue to blind us to realities of human experience,2 0
2

See text accompanying notes 103-09 supra for discussion of these three func-

tions.
21

tions.

See, e.g., notes 185 and 194 supra for discussion of Platonic-Cartesian concep-
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reconstruction requires that careful observation of the pro-

cesses and products of judicial reasoning be performed with the
explicit aim of changing the way we conceive those
phenomena.211This means accepting the difficulty and trauma
of basic change in one's concept system.
It was noted that reconstruction requires synthesis of presently fragmented perspectives. 2 In its "inward-looking" as-

pect this synthesis signifies attitudes of cooperation among
adherents if the various perspectives.23 The enterprise of reconstruction, like the enterprise of judicial decision itself, accordingly must be seen as a "public, cooperative enterprise"-as a "multi-person encounter" characterized by "true
dialogue" in which the participants expect to be changed.24
Reconstruction thus requires openness not just to the phenomena studied but to the diverse perspectives of other participants in the enterprise as well.
While the problem of fragmented perspectives commonly
is perceived in terms such as the parable of the blind Hindi who
each feel different parts of a single elephant, 235 a more accurate

metaphor is one in which all inquirers see the entire elephant
but disagree as to which part is the most important. These
determinations of importance, in turn, are largely a function of
" See note 136 and accompanying text suprafor earlier development of this point.
"2 See note 198 and accompanying text supra for statement of this point.
2 Such attitudes of cooperation contrast sharply with prevailing attitudes of
competition among adherents of particular perspectives, who, as Felix Cohen suggested to be true of legal philosophers, "are generally right in what they affirm of their
own vision and generally wrong in what they deny of the vision of others." Cohen, Field
Theory and JudicialLogic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 269 (1950).
21' See note 195 supra for the above-quoted phrases, used in describing interdependence in moral deliberation.
2 See, e.g., Cohen, Book Review (H. CAIRN, LEGAL PamosoPir FROM PLATO TO
HEGEL), 10 J. HIST. IDEAS 575, 579 (1949).
21 For such a metaphor see Cohen, The Relativity of PhilosophicalSystems and
the Method of Systematic Relativism, 36 J. OF PHILOSOPHY 57, 57 (1939) (parable of
two Hottentot hunters, one of whom counted a rank of elephants from left to right and
the other from right to left-leading to bloody dispute over which was "Elephant No.
1").
The same truth is seen in the observation that legal writing is not discovery, but
emphasis, Editors'Preface, supra note 98, at 1555, and in Karl Llewellyn's statement
that none of the legal realists' ideas were new but that what "is as novel as it is vital
* * , is to pick up such ideas and set about consistently, persistently, insistently to
carry them through." Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism-Responding to Dean
Pound, 44 HARv. L. REv. 1222, 1238 (1931).
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value judgment.2 7 This leads to a third inward aspect of the
enterprise of reconstruction, tied to the problem of subjective
valuation in academic work.?5
One consequence of recognizing the pervasiveness of valuation in judicial reasoning, it was earlier observed, is to give
increased theoretic significance to the "gyrocompass" of collegial deliberation.29 This applies equally to valuation in the
work of reconstruction. That is, the "public, cooperative" character of the reconstruction enterprise signifies a means not
merely of joining diverse modalities of explanation, but also of
mediating-through mutual self-disclosure and open dialogue-the values that underlie our work.240
z While the aim of the legal realists was to free the judge to do justice in the case
at hand, see notes 74-75 and accompanying text supra, the program of analytical jurisprudence is to forge the "fetters" that will restrain judges. See notes 9-11 and accompanying text supra.
Value judgment in jurisprudential thought is central to the analysis of Duncan
Kennedy in Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, supra note 59. The
ideal of formalism, Kennedy argues, corresponds to an "individualist" social order that
strives to maximize the realization of individual goals and minimize judicial intervention in the affairs of society. Id. at 1776-81. By contrast, Kennedy argues, non-formalist
acceptance of value-based judicial decision-which is implicit in the decisionistic
model developed herein-rests on the ideal of an "altruist" social order in which each
individual, willing to compromise his desires with those of others, accepts a judicial
role that is by definition less circumscribed and more interventionist than under the
formalist model. Id. at 1771-74. Kennedy's altruist-individualist polarity doubtless
marks only one of a number of value judgments concerning the social order and the
proper role of the judiciary that underlie espousal of the decisionistic perspective.
2u While the proposition that valuation influences scholarly work is not an unfamiliar one, it is largely eclipsed by the ethos of value-neutral technology that dominates academia as it dominates other institutions of modem society. Indeed, one
should understand that the academic's prison house, see text accompanying notes 11134 supra, is not a prison but a haven. Its ethos of value-neutral study is the source and
sanctum of our professional identity. To leave this faith, as Unger's analysis suggests
we must, see LAw IN MODERN SocIrY, supra note 1, at 266-68, and come to terms with
the union of perception and valuation in our work, is a difficult and frightening prospect.
" See note 195 supra for development of this point.
240John Kenneth Galbraith has argued that the Western world now faces the
question of how democracy can be reconciled with the increasingly important role
necessarily played by an "educational and scientific estate" in technological society.
J. GALBnmrrii, THE NEW INDusTRAL STATE 387 (1967). The synthesizing and checking
of valuations through disclosure and dialogue in a community of academic inquiry
seems to provide at least part of the necessary answer.

